Was Pilot Error and Lax Government Airfield Safety Regulations to Blame for Jeju Air Disaster?
Now that the initial shock of the Jeju Air plane crash has passed, the Korean media is starting to ask the tough questions on why this crashed happened:
The right engine (in red circle) of Jeju Air Flight 7C2216 (Boeing 737-800) appears to be open for reverse thrust during an attempted belly landing at Muan International Airport, Sunday. Captured from video provided by a reader
A range of questions has emerged regarding the Jeju Air passenger plane crash that occurred on the morning of Dec. 29 at Muan International Airport in South Jeolla Province. Key issues include whether the engine’s reverse thrust was engaged during the emergency landing and why the plane did not jettison fuel before the accident.
A former commercial pilot and aviation experts analyzing video footage from the crash said it is likely the engine reverse thrust was activated. However, they noted a weak correlation between the absence of fuel jettisoning and the scale of the crash’s impact.
Was reverse thrust activated?
Of the 181 passengers and crew aboard, 179 lost their lives when the plane slid off the runway during an emergency belly landing, eventually colliding with a concrete structure holding the localizer antenna. The absence of landing gear, which plays a critical braking role, was cited as the primary cause.
However, questions remain about whether auxiliary speed-reduction mechanisms, such as flaps, spoilers, or reverse thrust, were properly deployed.
A former commercial pilot said, “Crash footage and photos show the engine covers were open, indicating that reverse thrust was engaged. While it cannot be ruled out that the covers opened due to the impact, it seems more plausible that the captain activated reverse thrust during the emergency.”
You can read more at the link, but the author also asks why the landing gear was not manually deployed and why the pilot landed in the middle of the runway among other strange circumstances from this crash. With the evidence available now it is looking like a bird strike that led to pilot error may be the cause of this crash. The crash was then made worse by the dirt and concrete antenna structure at the end of the runway:
The remnants and debris of the Jeju Air passenger plane, which exploded after attempting a belly landing and colliding the previous day, remain on the runway at Muan International Airport in South Jeolla Province, Monday. Yonhap
Debate is intensifying over whether the design of a structure at Muan International Airport in South Jeolla Province exacerbated the impact of the recent Jeju Air passenger plane crash.
Experts argue that the structure, constructed with soil and concrete in a tall and rigid design, amplified the impact and worsened the resulting damage.
The government maintains that the facility complies with both domestic and international regulations. However, revelations that design guidelines from four years ago recommended breakable materials to minimize damage have further fueled the controversy.
The localizer, a safety facility guiding aircraft during landing, has been criticized for being constructed with rigid materials, contrary to international standards.
You can read more at the link, but the Korea Times is also reporting that Muan International Airport also lacked the proper amount of personnel to ward off birds to prevent bird strikes:
A suspected bird strike, identified as one of the causes of the Jeju Air crash last Sunday, has raised concerns about the adequacy of bird control operations at Muan International Airport. At the time of the incident, only one Bird Alert Team (BAT), commonly referred to as “Batman,” was on duty, prompting questions about whether staffing levels and operational protocols were sufficient.
BAT units typically use firearms and other deterrents to drive birds away from airport grounds and communicate directly with the control tower when bird flocks are spotted.
According to sources compiled by the Hankook Ilbo, only one BAT member was working during the suspected bird strike, which likely occurred between 8:57 a.m. and 8:59 a.m. This contradicts earlier statements by the government’s Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters, which said two members were present that day.
You can read more at the link, but the article says that Muan has the highest per capita number of bird strikes of any airport in South Korea. Despite this fact nothing was done to increase the number of personnel needed to prevent bird strikes. So now you add in lax government airfield safety regulations on top of possible pilot error and this Jeju Air crash could end up being a major black eye for the Korean aviation industry.
A black eye is certainly better than what the souls on board that airplane received.
As has been the case from the beginning, the false narrative has to be modified with yet another false narrative when new information comes out.
In this case, the reverse thrust is meaningless.
That engine was not functioning after the bird strike. If it had been reverse thrusting, the plane would have been spinning clockwise down the runway.
As the lies have slipped away, it has become increasingly clear what happened.
– the pilot lined up for a normal approach from the south with flaps down
– the right engine ate a bird
– the pilot raised the flaps, powered the remaining engine, aborted the landing, and overflew the runway
– the pilot shut down the engine… but he shut down the wrong engine
– with both engines off, the pilot had no hydraulics to lower flaps or landing gear and was low to the ground
– there was no time to restart the engine or manually lower the gear and there was panic in the cockpit
– the pilot made a tight circle and approached from the north, landing in the middle of the runway at high speed and no way to slow down
– the plane hit the hardened structure at the end of the runway that “conformed to international standards blah blah blah” that the entire airport staff saw everyday yet nobody asked what would happen when a plane eventually overshot the runway
This is the only scenario that fits all the evidence. As the story has shifted closer and closer to the truth over the last few days, little inconsistencies in actions and timelines being clearified only strengthens this conclusion.
There is clearly a conspiracy now.
There is an unspoken conspiracy of shared values in Korean government and media to hide conclusions that will bring dometic and international attention to pilot training, airport management, and fundemental aviation safety planning and culture.
This is a shameful event in Korea on many levels that needs to be exposed gradually to ensure the difficult questions are not asked all at once.
On the positive side, Korean lack of “diversity” will ensure unified national attention to these issues and they will be corrected, as they have been after every disaster.
Koreans lack the imagination necessary to ask, “but what if…?” Yet they think rationally enough to recognize a clear problem and formulate a clear solution.
By this time next year, all antennas will be on flat ground and raised on breakaway metal frames. Consideration will be given to the potential pathways at the end of the runways. Pilots will receive additional training on this scenario and similar ones so the correct response is automatic. There will be a few flashy actions to show the public Something Is Being Done.
There will likely not be any revelations that will change this opinion, but let’s see.
Yes, we were talking about this at work and came to the same conclusion. Pilot error. Nothing else fits.
The voice recorder likely won’t show them following the checklist, but it may reveal panic, so it will be withheld. And at least one of the pilots, probably the senior, will turn out to have not gotten proper crew rest.
Statistically, that is…
The black boxes will be sent to America.
Official story: It will take a couple of months to retrieve the data.
Reality: Bob, hand me the USB cable. (5 minutes later) Looks like that ChickenHead guy was right.
When We Get the Conclusion: When politicians are about to do something very terrible that would normally dominate the news cycle.
There are others talking about pilot error and possible cockpit issues. Plus 8 minutes is not enough time to actually do the landing checklist.
David Learmount is considered an expert in his field and has over 50 years of experience in aviation on everything from personally flying to devloping SOPs to journalism and consulting. He says that the pilot made about as good as a landing as possible and that pilot error wasn’t the issue, rather he is shocked at the airport design.
“That is unbelievably awful”
“I’ve never seen anything like this anywhere ever before”
https://youtu.be/1vjMRCG7Mjg?si=LLl76zN142QY2qrS
Many other experts have shared similar shock at the concrete structure.
The elephant in the room everyone in Korea avoids mentioning publicly is that this has Jeolla-do written all over it. The bird infested location, the strange design choices, the unusually long planing and construction time, the investivation finding Muan airport’s own internal guidelines had flagged a failure to comply with recomended length space of the runway, the instantaneous blaming of Jeju airlines…
Ah, Jeolla-do never change.
What the hell is wrong with people?
David Learmount is stupid or lying. He is intentionally diverting attention and muddling the issues.
The landing and the airport design are two different issues.
If the pilot had landed properly, nobody would have noticed the airport design.
If the airport had been designed properly, the loss of life would have been less, the pilot would have been a “hero”, and his mistakes would have gotten no public attention.
The extension of the runway is a non-issue, as the pilot landed in the middle of the runway with his flaps up and his landing gear up and every tool used for reducing speed unused except (yet unexplainably) the engine reverser on an unusable engine.
“the pilot made about as good as a landing as possible and that pilot error wasn’t the issue”
Let’s consider if this is a true statement.
The plane clearly landed with both engines off or the pilot didn’t use that power to burn off fuel or lower flaps and landing gear (pilot error).
It seems a bird took out one engine on video, lined up a few hundred meters from the end of the runway. Maybe the second engine was lost and we didn’t see it. Why not just glide in and complete the landing instead of circling around with no power? An unpowered go-around seems like an unlikely choice and would certainly be pilot error.
But we know the other engine was working because the flaps were down in the birdstrike video and we know the plane gained altitude. The pilot aborted the landing he was fully prepared for. This begins to look like pilot error.
So how did the other engine shut down between the raising of flaps and altitude gain and the decision to make a tight unpowered circle that put the landing in the middle of the runway?
This list is quite small with statistically improbable entries… exept… the pilot errored and shut off the working engine. Pilot error.
This forced a tight unpowered turn with gear and flaps stuck up.
So perhaps the pilot DID make as good as a landing as possible… within the conditions created by… pilot error.
If anyone has a different theory that fits the known facts, please share. If there is some fatal flaw in my reasoning, please point it out.
Pilot error.
Had Mike read the last couple of posts and watch the video (we are on vacation in Park City, happy new year everyone) he said assuming the preconditions CH has described are accurate he is correct. He also agrees with the aviation expert on the barrier he has never seen that either.
I believe pilot error will be found in the investigation, but I also think that systems and methods really should have a tolerance for a certain margin of error, and when even Muan airport guidance admits there wasn’t enough prior to the crash, it’s pretty damning evidence they knew they were tempting fate. All successful, well engineered systems have a certain amount of tolerance for error factored in, for the same reason why planes have redundancies, so do airports, well not Muan.
The original planning process as well knew they were tempting fate. The close proximity to THREE well know bird migration patterns was noted to be unusually high risk for bird strikes, and that it was a bad location. They did it anyways as a political pay off to Jeolla. It has also come out they only had one Bird Alert Team member on deck when similar sized airports typically have as many as 4. The bird strike also happened during a shift turn over. Worse, Muan has for many years held the highest rate of bird strikes in Korea yet they never took steps to get that number down.
The reason why the Korean media is trying to focus on the airline is to avoid the Jeolla political/social aspect.
Did you know the number of traffic accidents in Korea is highest in Jeolla as well? Sure, driver error is a cause, but did you know they build roads differently there? They often don’t fall within typical design standards. Jeolla is like that in everything from its airports to its roads to (a lack of) workplace safety standards. Conincidently, “accidents” and Jeolla are typical news in Korea.
Back to pilot error, perhaps the pilot assumed this airport was like any other and that he had a good margin of error past the end of the run way. In any other airport he would’ve been right.
The leftist wanted an airport soooo badly in Jolla commie do that they built it in middle of a wetland bird sanctuary. Of course calls for naming the airport the Kim Dae Jung Memorial airport have quickly faded.