Removing the North Korean artillery from areas along the DMZ would be a huge concession by the Kim regime which is why I would be surprised to see this happen:
Military officials from the two Koreas hold rare talks at the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom on June 14, 2018, in this photo released by the joint press corps. (Yonhap)
South Korea proposed that North Korea move its long-range artillery away from the heavily fortified border in an effort to reduce tensions during last week’s rare cross-border military talks, government sources here said Sunday.
During Thursday’s general-grade meeting, the first in more than a decade, Seoul made a series of suggestions, including relocating the artillery pieces to areas 30 to 40 kilometers away from the Military Demarcation Line separating the two Koreas, the insiders said.
The two sides held the talks to follow up on the Panmunjom Declaration from the April 27 inter-Korean summit at the truce village, which calls for joint efforts to alleviate military tensions and “practically eliminate the danger of war.”
“We conveyed our position to the North that in light of consultations between the North and the United States over the denuclearization issue, we have to craft measures to drastically reduce military tensions by removing practical threats,” a source said on condition of anonymity.
“I understand that (the South) suggested moving the North’s artillery that threatens the Seoul metropolitan area to rear areas so as to actively implement the Panmunjom Declaration,” the source added.
According to a 2016 South Korean defense white paper, the North has 14,100 artillery pieces, including 5,500 multiple rocket launchers, a majority of which have been deployed near the border.
Pyongyang is known to possess a variety of rocket systems, including 170 mm-caliber self-propelled howitzers and 240 mm multiple rocket launchers that can easily target Seoul and surrounding areas.
The North’s longer-range 300 mm multiple rocket launcher is seen as more formidable, as it is capable of reaching key U.S. military installations in Pyeongtaek in Gyeonggi Province and the headquarters of the South’s Army, Navy and Air Force in the Gyeryongdae military compound in South Chungcheong Province. [Yonhap]
You can read more at the link, but North Korea’s artillery has been their source of deterrence for decades. If it wasn’t for North Korea’s artillery threat on Seoul a regime change war would have likely happened by now considering the outrageous provocations the Kim regime has committed over the years.
Removing the artillery from its carefully hardened positions on the DMZ would ultimately be a threat to regime security which is why I would be surprised to see this happen.
Former President Lee Myung-bak enters the Seoul Central District Court in Seoul on June 15, 2018, to attend a hearing in his trial on alleged corruption. (Yonhap)
Does anyone think it is just a coincidence that the North Korean human rights office in South Korea is shut down shortly after the summit between Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in?:
South Korea’s unification ministry said Thursday that it has closed the office for a state-run foundation for North Korea’s human rights, whose launch has been delayed for nearly two years amid political differences.
The ministry, which handles inter-Korean relations, said that it will terminate the lease contract for the office in Seoul this month to prevent the further waste of government funds, estimated at around 63 million won ($58,120) every month. The office has been vacant since first being rented 21 months ago.
“The move is only an administrative and operational measure to stem further financial losses. The government’s stance to launch the foundation on human rights for North Korean citizens as soon as possible remains unchanged,” the ministry said. [Korea Times]
A pair of Democratic senators on Wednesday introduced an amendment to the annual defense policy bill that would stop President Trump from withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea without the Pentagon’s input.
The amendment “would help prevent the President from making a rash decision about troop reductions on the Korean Peninsula that negatively impacts our national security,” Sens. Tammy Duckworth (Ill.) and Chris Murphy (Conn.) said in a joint statement.
Introduced for the Fiscal 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the provision would stop a withdraw “unless the U.S. Secretary of Defense certifies it is in our national security interest and would not significantly undermine the security of our allies in the region.” [The Hill]
Staff from Korea Post collect mattresses made by Daijin Bed Co., which have been found to release radiation at levels that exceed the safety standard, in Seoul on June 16, 2018. (Yonhap)
Over at the Diplomat there is an interesting article published about former US President Jimmy Carter’s failed attempt to remove US ground troops from South Korea during his term in office:
South Korean President Park Chung Hee, right, leads American President Jimmy Carter to his awaiting helicopter after Carter arrived for two days of talks in Korea (June 29, 1979).
With U.S. President Donald Trump once more touting his desire to withdraw the 28,500 U.S. troops currently stationed in South Korea, it is perhaps worthwhile briefly examining the last time an American president attempted to remove U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula. U.S. President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s was ultimately stopped by congressional obstruction, the Pentagon, and the intelligence community, among others, from implementing a troop withdrawal policy he had repeatedly promised during his presidential campaign in 1976. Put otherwise, and to use 21st century Trumpian parlance: the so-called “deep state” stopped Carter from executing his plans.
During the 1976 presidential campaign — the same year two American soldiers were axed to death by North Korean soldiers in the demilitarized zone — Carter repeatedly voiced his desire to pull out the 40,000 American soldiers (out of which only 15,000 were combat troops) from South Korea, where they served as a de factotripwire to deter a North Korean invasion. For example, at a Foreign Policy Association luncheon that year Carter declared: “I believe that it will be possible to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after consultation with both South Korea and Japan.” [The Diplomat via a reader tip]
You can read much more at the link, but basically the intelligence community changed its assessment to state that North Korea had a military advantage over South Korea and removing US ground troops would only increase their advantage. This gave opponents of Carter’s troop removal plan the backing they needed to oppose and eventually stop it. President Carter has always been skeptical of the assessment and how the bureaucracy circled the wagons to stop his troop withdrawal strategy.
Carter wanted to pull out the ground troops to put pressure on South Korean President Park Chung-hee to implement democratic reforms. Carter may have failed in his quest to remove US ground troops, but he did indirectly succeed in getting Park Chung-hee removed from office. In October 1979, Park was assassinated by the Korean CIA chief Kim Jae-gyu as part of a coup attempt against him. After the coup attempt failed, Kim said one of the reasons for the coup was to restore the US-ROK relationship that had been so badly damaged by Park’s rule.
So are there any lessons President Trump could learn from Carter’s failed bid to remove US ground troops from Korea if he decides to do that? I don’t think so because of how different the circumstances are. It is clear today that South Korea has a conventional military advantage over North Korea thus muting concerns that US military leadership may have. When former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld moved entire combat brigade from South Korea in 2004 to send to Iraq there was little pushback because of the ROK military advantage.
If President Trump does decide to remove US troops from Korea as part of a larger deal over North Korea’s nuclear weapons, I suspect there would be little pushback compared to what Carter experienced.
I understand these banks have to do due diligence in preparation to support any investments in North Korea, but this is all irrelevant unless the Trump administration drops sanctions:
South Korean banks, including Shinhan Financial Group and KB Financial Group — have set up task forces to conduct research on inter-Korean economic projects.
Earlier this month, Shinhan Financial launched a task force on North Korea.
The task force was manned by executives from the financial holding firm’s affiliates, including Shinhan Bank.
KB Financial has also set up a task force to review how it could take part in North Korea’s fiancial business operations if inter-Korean cooperation gains further momentum.
KEB Hana Bank will launch a team to draw up plans for financial support in North Korea when inter-Korean economic projects resume.
An official at KEB Hana Bank said the bank is interested in opening a branch in North Korea, but it will be possible “when political conditions are ripe.” [Yonhap]
As I have been saying the suspension of joint exercises with South Korea is something that is easily reversible and can be used as negotiating leverage against the Kim regime:
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, left, toasts North Korean officials, including Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee Kim Yong Chol, in New York City, May 30, 2018.
President Donald Trump will resume military exercises with South Korea if the North stops negotiating in good faith over its nuclear weapons program, the top U.S. diplomat said Wednesday.
The tempered expectations were markedly different from the optimistic tone set by Trump in a series of tweets earlier in the day. [Stars & Stripes]
You can read more at the link, but I think we will know whether North Korea is negotiating in good faith by the Key Resolve exercise timeframe early next year. If North Korea is not making any irreversible progress towards denuclearization I would expect this exercise would be executed as scheduled.
Solid comments by all interviewed authorities. I strongly recommend reading this discussion prior to the upcoming Singapore summit. https://t.co/O7F9P734KO
