Category: Korean War

Who Were the Soldiers of the 7th Cavalry?

The tragedy at No Gun-ri has been a point of much debate since the publishing of the 1999 Pulitzer Prize winning article from the Associated Press that suggests that the soldiers of the US 7th Cavalry are heartless killers of helpless Korean civilians while acting on the orders of even greater heartless leaders from above. I believe before condemning soldiers especially those who didn’t even volunteer to go to war, but were conscripted as heartless war criminals it is important to understand the context of the situation that these men were put into. The original AP article dismisses these men as “poorly trained and ill equipped”, I hope to show through closer analysis why these men were ill trained and poorly equipped and how this was one of the factors that led to what I call the “perfect storm” of events that ultimately ended with the tragedy at No Gun-ri.

Before the outbreak of the Korean War the soldiers involved in the tragedy at No Gun-ri, soldiers from H Company, 2 Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment which were part of the 1st Cavalry Divison. They were stationed in Japan conducting peacekeeping operations in the aftermath of World War II. Due to budgetary reasons most of the resources for training soldiers at the combined arms level were diverted to Europe because of the looming Soviet threat there. No one ever envisioned a war in Korea. This lack of vision would become one of many factors that led to the tragedy at No Gun-ri.

The soldiers of the 7th Cavalry did not train at anything above the company level and spent much of their time conducting occupation related duties, not to mention hanging out at the local clubs at all hours of the night. Plus the units were all short of personnel especially noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to keep the Army divisions in Europe fully manned against the more immediate Soviet threat there. The 7th Cavalry was full of young, patriotic, soldiers who grew up on John Wayne movies and were eager to serve their country. However the majority of these young soldiers were not old enough to have served during World War II and lacked combat experience.

There were a few NCOs and officers in the unit that did have combat experience. However, when the war in Korea did break out the experienced NCOs from the 7th Cavalry were pulled to fill units from the 24th Infantry Division that were the first division in Japan to deploy to Korea to delay the North Korean advance that included units such as Task Force Smith.

I have always found this statement from T.R. Fehrenbach (pg102) to best describe the state of the US military leading up the Korean War:

..the abiding weakness of free peoples is that their governments cannot or will not make them prepare or sacrifice before they are aroused.

The military had been under funded for years after World War II and the politicians were unwilling to raise the amount of money necessary to ensure the military was properly trained and equipped. Additionally the initial sanatizing of the war by the government as a “Police Action” did not arouse the citizens of the United States enough to be committed to a full scale war. This failure at the governmental level all had a part to play with the tragedy at No Gun-ri.

From Pohang to No Gun-ri

Once it came time for the 1st Cavalry Division to deploy to Korea, it was deployed in piece meal and not as a complete division due to the nature of limited ports in Korea and the division being spread out all over Japan due to occupation duties. So when the 2-7 Cav’s transport from Japan arrived in Korea on July 22, 1950 they were acting semi-autonomous from the division command structure they were used to, plus they were about to undertake operations they had never trained for because they had never done any training above the company level and were about to undertake operations in a major theater war that featured many uncontemporary operating environment problems, such as security in the rear areas and a massive refugee crisis no one had any prior experience or training to deal with. Refugees was almost a totally new concept because the US military had little experience dealing with a mass refugee crisis during World War II. In Korea the US forces were faced with a refugee crisis of epic proportions that no one expected.

To deal with the refugee crisis the soldiers on the ground were literally making up doctrine as they went through trial and error. To make matters worse they were short NCO’s across the regiment that enforce standards. It was so bad that there was some Private First Classes serving as Platoon Sergeants. The officer ranks weren’t much better as the battalion only had one officer with combat experience at the time and that was the commander of G company, 2-7 Cav, CPT Henry West. This lack of inexperience and training would all have a part to play in the tragedy that would occur four days later.

Almost from the moment the 7th Cavalry regiment unloaded their boats and moved out of Pohang to fight the North Koreans the stragglers of soldiers from the 24th Infantry Division who had been defeated by the North Koreans, and who were retreating South told tales of how the North Koreans were dressing up as civilians to enter the rear areas of the American units to the 7th Cav soldiers.

Here is this report from Robert Bateman’s book, No Gun-ri, that chronicles this fear:

… a civilian woman who appeared pregnant and her male companion who were attempting to pass through American lines. At an American checkpoint there were stopped and searched along with other civilians in the group. At that point the searchers discovered that the pregnancy was not real , and that the bulge covered by the woman’s clothing was actually a two way tactical radio. The woman immediately confessed that she was North Korean and was sent to observe and report American positions and to call for artillery fire on them.

Then reports of American GI’s in the rear found with their hands tied behind their backs and shot in the head began to circulate among the soldiers as well. Long before the 7th Cav had ever reached their defensive positions near Hwanggan there had been plenty of warning about the dangers of letting refugees through the front lines. This was something that was in the back of all the soldiers minds more than the North Korean Army they had yet to face.

The night of 25-26 July, 1950 these inexperienced soldiers would have their first experience with what was then known as the “bug out” syndrome that happened to US soldiers in the early days of the Korean War. At about 0200 that night one of the last elements of the 24ID that was lost and unaccounted for finally found the proper road to retreat south on. This unit included a company of tanks. The road they moved south on went right through the 7th Cav’s defensive lines.

It was dark, their was no night vision devices back then, no communications with anyone in the 24ID, lack of combat experience, and just plain fear that caused the soldier of the 7th Cavalry to open up fire on the American unit. The 24ID unit just simply drove through the hail of gun fire and continued their retreat south not really knowing who was firing on them. Fortunately no one from the unit was killed.

Many soldiers of the 7th Cavalry thought that the retreating company of tanks was in fact a North Korean armored column moving through their lines and opened fire. Experienced NCO’s could of detected the sound of the tanks as American tanks and not North Korean tanks, but remember all the experienced NCO’s from the division got pulled in Japan weeks prior, to serve with the 24ID, leaving the 7th Cavalry with no experienced NCO’s. Remember there was Private First Classes serving as Platoon Sergeants. The now, even more frightful soldiers, were thinking that the North Koreans were in their rear waiting to kill them and many soldiers just simply “bugged out” after the tanks passed and left their fighting positions and retreated. Nobody in the infantry likes to have tanks in front of them much less behind them as well.

CPT Melbourne Chandler the commander of H/2-7CAV was able to consolidate some of his retreating troops and other stragglers of the 7th Cavalry in the predawn darkness to form a defensive line with this hodgepodge of troops. The defensive perimeter was set up on a small hill overlooking a bridge near a place called No Gun-ri.

Next Posting: What Happened at No Gun-ri?

I have been working on transferring over comments from the old GI Korea Tripod site to my current WordPress site this week when I noticed this comment that had been posted on the old site. The comment was from someone claiming to be Charles Hanley, one of the Associated Press reporters who published the highly flawed No Gun-ri article that won the Pulitzer Prize.  Here is what he had to say:

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Since your blog seems to have an interest in No Gun Ri, perhaps you’d like to see something reality-based (and based on actual professional news reporting). Here it is, published several months ago…

BC-No Gun Ri-Letter

Tuesday, May 30, 2006

Ambassador’s 1950 letter says U.S. set policy of shooting refugees

Eds: A multimedia interactive is available in the nogunri folder and a document slugged nongunri.pdf will be available in the _documents folder on Monday.

AP Photos of May 25: NY517-519

AP Graphic NO GUN RI BRIDGE

By CHARLES J. HANLEY and MARTHA MENDOZA

Associated Press Writers

More than a half-century after hostilities ended in Korea, a document from the war’s chaotic early days has come to light _ a letter from the U.S. ambassador to Seoul, informing the State Department that American soldiers would shoot refugees approaching their lines.

The letter _ dated the day of the Army’s mass killing of South Korean refugees at No Gun Ri in 1950 _ is the strongest indication yet that such a policy existed for all U.S. forces in Korea, and the first evidence that that policy was known to upper ranks of the U.S. government.

“If refugees do appear from north of US lines they will receive warning shots, and if they then persist in advancing they will be shot,” wrote Ambassador John J. Muccio, in his message to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

The letter reported on decisions made at a high-level meeting in South Korea on July 25, 1950, the night before the 7th U.S. Cavalry Regiment shot the refugees at No Gun Ri.

Estimates vary on the number of dead at No Gun Ri. American soldiers’ estimates ranged from under 100 to “hundreds” dead; Korean survivors say about 400, mostly women and children, were killed at the village 100 miles southeast of Seoul, the South Korean capital. Hundreds more refugees were killed in later, similar episodes, survivors say.

The No Gun Ri killings were documented in a Pulitzer Prize-winning story by The Associated Press in 1999, which prompted a 16-month Pentagon inquiry.

The Pentagon concluded that the No Gun Ri shootings, which lasted three days, were “an unfortunate tragedy” _ “not a deliberate killing.” It suggested panicky soldiers, acting without orders, opened fire because they feared that an approaching line of families, baggage and farm animals concealed enemy troops.

But Muccio’s letter indicates the actions of the 7th Cavalry were consistent with policy, adopted because of concern that North Koreans would infiltrate via refugee columns. And in subsequent months, U.S. commanders repeatedly ordered refugees shot, documents show.

The Muccio letter, declassified in 1982, is discussed in a new book by American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz, who discovered the document at the U.S. National Archives, where the AP also has obtained a copy.

Conway-Lanz, a former Harvard historian and now an archivist of the National Archives’ Nixon collection, was awarded the Stuart L. Bernath Award of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations for the article on which the book is based.

“With this additional piece of evidence, the Pentagon report’s interpretation (of No Gun Ri) becomes difficult to sustain,” Conway-Lanz argues in his book, “Collateral Damage,” published this spring by Routledge.

The Army report’s own list of sources for the 1999-2001 investigation shows its researchers reviewed the microfilm containing the Muccio letter. But the 300-page report did not mention it.

Asked about this, Pentagon spokeswoman Betsy Weiner would say only that the Army inspector general’s report was “an accurate and objective portrayal of the available facts based on 13 months of work.”

Said Louis Caldera, who was Army secretary in 2001 and is now University of New Mexico president, “Millions of pages of files were reviewed and it is certainly possible they may have simply missed it.”

Ex-journalist and Korean War veteran Don Oberdorfer, a historian of Korea who served on a team of outside experts who reviewed the investigation, said he did not recall seeing the Muccio message. “I don’t know why, since the military claimed to have combed all records from any source.”

Muccio noted in his 1950 letter that U.S. commanders feared disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating American lines via refugee columns.

As a result, those meeting on the night of July 25, 1950 _ top staff officers of the U.S. 8th Army, Muccio’s representative Harold J. Noble and South Korean officials _ decided on a policy of air-dropping leaflets telling South Korean civilians not to head south toward U.S. defense lines, and of shooting them if they did approach U.S. lines despite warning shots, the ambassador wrote to Rusk.

Rusk, Muccio and Noble, who was embassy first secretary, are all dead. It is not known what action, if any, Rusk and others in Washington may have taken as a result of the letter.

Muccio told Rusk, who later served as U.S. secretary of state during the Vietnam War, that he was writing him “in view of the possibility of repercussions in the United States” from such deadly U.S. tactics.

But the No Gun Ri killings _ as well as others in the ensuing months _ remained hidden from history until the AP report of 1999, in which ex-soldiers who were at No Gun Ri corroborated the Korean survivors’ accounts.

Survivors said U.S. soldiers first forced them from nearby villages on July 25, 1950, and then stopped them in front of U.S. lines the next day, when they were attacked without warning by aircraft as hundreds sat atop a railroad embankment. Troops of the 7th Cavalry followed with ground fire as survivors took shelter under a railroad bridge.

The late Army Col. Robert M. Carroll, a lieutenant at No Gun Ri, said he remembered the order radioed across the warfront on the morning of July 26 to stop refugees from crossing battle lines. “What do you do when you’re told nobody comes through?” he said in a 1998 interview. “We had to shoot them to hold them back.”

Other soldier witnesses attested to radioed orders to open fire at No Gun Ri.

Since that episode was confirmed in 1999, South Koreans have lodged complaints with the Seoul government about more than 60 other alleged large-scale killings of refugees by the U.S. military in the 1950-53 war.

The Army report of 2001 acknowledged investigators learned of other, unspecified civilian killings, but said these would not be investigated.

Meanwhile, AP research uncovered at least 19 declassified U.S. military documents showing commanders ordered or authorized such killings in 1950-51.

The Army’s denial that the killings were ordered is a “deception of No Gun Ri victims and of U.S. citizens who value human rights,” Chung Koo-do, spokesman for the victims’ committee, told the AP in South Korea. He called the 2001 finding a “nasty” shifting of blame to rank-and-file soldiers, and called on President Bush to reopen the case.

Even if infiltrators are present, soldiers need to take “due precautions” to protect civilian lives, said Francois Bugnion, director for international law for the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, global authority on the laws of war.

After reviewing the 1950 letter, Bugnion said the standard on war crimes is clear.

“In the case of a deliberate attack directed against civilians identified as such, then this would amount to a violation of the law of armed conflict,” he said.

Gary Solis, a West Point expert on war crimes, said the policy described by Muccio clearly “deviates from typical wartime procedures. It’s an obvious violation of the bedrock core principle of the law of armed conflict _ distinction.”

Solis said soldiers always have the right to defend themselves. But “noncombatants are not to be purposely targeted.”

But William Eckhardt, lead Army prosecutor in the My Lai atrocities case in Vietnam, sensed “angst, great angst” in the letter because officials worried about what might happen. “If a mob doesn’t stop when they’re coming at you, you fire over their heads and if they still don’t stop you fire at them. Standard procedure,” he said.

In South Korea, Yi Mahn-yol, head of the National Institute of Korean History and a member of a government panel on No Gun Ri, said the Muccio letter sheds an entirely new light on a case that “so far has been presented as an accidental incident that didn’t involve the command system.”

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AP Investigative Researcher Randy Herschaft in New York and AP Writer Jae-soon Chang in Seoul contributed to this report.

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In response to the AP Article and the AP’s corresponding book, a US Army Major, Robert Bateman was able to find a number of inaccuracies in the AP’s reporting and wrote his own book that clearly shows the inaccuracies in their reporting and uncovered witnesses that were not at No Gun-ri that the AP quoted in their reporting. Based on reading both books and reading endless amounts of articles and material about No Gun-ri I created my own series of posts about what happened.

Judging from Mr. Hanley’s comment he doesn’t seem to like me challenging his findings and appears to think Bateman’s research should be discounted because he is not a professional journalist. He links to his own AP article from May of 2006 as evidence that his views on what happened at No Gun-ri are validated. I had a good debate with Haisan over at the Marmot’s Hole over Handley’s article earlier this year that covered a lot of what I believe about what happened at No Gun-ri, but I’m going to put my thoughts together in a updated series posting for everyone to read over the coming days. I hope this will spark some debate about the actual historical evidence of what happened at No Gun-ri compared to the mythology advocated by many in the media.

Canada’s Contributions to the Korean War

The United States has a long history of sharing the sacrifices of war with our northern neighbor of Canada and the Korean War was no different. With the outbreak of the Korean War the Canadian government did not immediately deploy troops to fight in the Korean War. The far east had never served any strategic national interest for Canada, especially a small, very poor country like Korea, which very few people had ever heard of before. Plus even if the Canadian government wanted to deploy soldiers to Korea, they simply did not have the manpower to do so. The Canadian military was not large enough for a deployment and maintain troop strength at home as well. After World War II, Canada had drastically reduced it’s military to a peace time size that was only interested in home land defense. With the United States as their southern neighbor and only Native American tribes as their northern frontier it didn’t take a very large military to compose a home land defense force.

As the fighting in Korea escalated and the United Nations put out a call to arms from it’s members to defend Korea, the Canadian government began to seek volunteers for what they called the Canadian Army Special Force (CASF) and was to be commanded by Brigadier General J.M. Rockingham. The CASF was to be composed of a full combat brigade of soldiers and it was going to take a few months to raise and train that many soldiers to fight in Korea. While the force was being formed the Canadian government had cargo planes from the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) begin transport duty for the UN forces between Ft. Lewis, Washington State and Haneda Airfield in Japan. Ft. Lewis was the major dispatch point of troops and supplies to fight in Korea. The RCAF contributed a total of 22 planes to help transport the needed supplies into the combat theatre. Additionally the Canadian government dispatched three naval destroyers to Korea. The destroyers arrived in July 1950 and would later serve during the September 1950 Inchon Landing Operation.

After General Douglas MacArthur’s successful Inchon Landing Operation it appeared that the Korean War was winding down and that full combat brigade of soldiers was not needed. So instead of deploying an entire brigade it was decided that only one infantry battalion would be deployed to Korea. That battalion would be the second battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Stone.

PPCLI’s Deployment to Korea

The second battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry regiment sailed from the port of Seattle to Korea on November 26, 1950 and didn’t arrive into the port of Yokohama, Japan until December 20, 1950. However, by the time the ship arrived in Japan the course of the war had changed dramatically. The Chinese military had entered the war and the UN forces were in full retreat from the Chinese onslaught. The Canadians had expected to take part in mop up and peacekeeping duty when they left Seattle, but by the time they reached Japan they discovered they were going to fight in a bloody, full scale war. The battalion was quickly rushed to the Korean peninsula and their first base camp would be in the city of Miryang near Daegu. Here the battalion would conduct training to prepare them for combat conditions in Korea. However, the battalion quickly found themselves in combat against South Korean communist guerrilla forces located in the southern mountains of Korea. After completing it’s actions against the guerrillas the PPCLI was assigned to the British led 27th Commonwealth Brigade which also included units from Australia and New Zealand plus one company of American tanks from Alpha Company 72nd Armor Regiment.

The PPCLI joined the 27th Brigade in mid-February and the Canadians saw their first combat action of the Korean War in late February during the UN offensive to the 38th parallel following the Chinese defeat at Chipyong-ni by the US 23 Infantry Regiment and their attached French Battalion. It was during this advance that the Canadians also received their first combat casualties of the Korean War. In April of 1951 the 27th Brigade was assigned to move south and construct blocking positions in the hills of Myeongjisan mountain just north of the city of Kapyong. The Chinese had launched their Spring Offensive of 1951 to recapture Seoul and the Kapyong valley was one of three high speed avenues of approach to capture Seoul. The other two were the Uijongbu and Munsan corridors. The Chinese had decided that the Kapyong Valley would be where they would concentrate their attack to recapture the Korean capitol. The Chinese command figured that if they recaptured Seoul they could negotiate a ceasefire from a position of strength since they controlled the South Korean capitol.

First Contact

The Chinese main effort during much of the Korean War focused on attacking South Korean frontline units first and then attacking American and UN units from the flanks after crushing the South Koreans. The Battle Kapyong would be no different. On the night of April 22, 1951 the Chinese 60th and 118th Division attacked the ROK 6th Division near the Hwacheon Reservoir just North of the Kapyong valley. The ROK 6th Division folded almost immediately into a full scale retreat back down the valley towards the 27th Regiment. The first column of ROK Army vehicles, equipment, and men flooded the 27th’s line before they had even been able to construct adequate fighting positions. What little obstacles and most importantly the communications wire the 27th had been able to put up were tore down as the South Koreans stormed South down the valley. As the South Koreans passed the 27th lines the retreat was able to be halted 5 miles south of Kapyong. The ROK 6th Division commander reported the next day that he was able to round up and organize 5,000 of his men or about 50% of his combat power from the day before.

After the two Chinese divisions had routed the ROK 6th Division, the CCF 118th Division was chosen to continue the attack down the Kapyong valley to finish off the ROK division. On the night of the April 23, 1951 the lead elements of the CCF 118th had hit the frontlines of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, which the Chinese commanders had not even realized were there. Thus the 27th though greatly out manned by about 3 to 1 by the Chinese had one advantage and that was surprise, which would help them fend off the Chinese attack.

The Battle of Kapyong

The first Chinese units moved quickly down the valley floor in pursuit of the retreating ROK units and smashed into Australian positions on each side of the valley augmented with the American tanks from Alpha Company 72nd Armor Regiment. The initial contact was chaotic because the Aussies and the Americans at first thought the soldiers coming down the valley were more retreating South Koreans. The fighting that erupted was ferocious, but the Australians and their American allies continued to hold on despite the huge disadvantage of limited obstacles and having no artillery support. The Australians could not communicate with their supporting New Zealand artillery battalion because of the retreating South Koreans ripping out the communications lines. Quickly the Australians were surrounded and the New Zealand artillery had to withdraw from their positions South of the Australians once they came into contact with the enemy. The New Zealand artillery withdrew further south down the valley and set up an artillery support position behind the British Middlesex Regiment.

The Australians requested reinforcements from the British, but the British company sent forward to reinforce the Australians took fire from the Chinese not to far North of the Middlesex Regimental lines and instead of fighting through the fire to aid the Australians the company took up defensive positions on the hillside. Seeing that no help was coming the Australian commander ordered his men and the supporting American tanks to conduct a tactical withdrawal south towards the Middlesex Regimental lines. As the Australians moved southward other supporting elements located behind the Australian lines confused the tactical fighting withdrawal southward as a full scale retreat and began running down the valley leaving their equipment behind. Their was a growing sense of impending disaster as panic mounted. As the Australians moved southward this caused the Chinese to come into increasing contact with the men of the Canadian Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry on Hill 677 commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Stone.

LTC Stone seeing the increasing amounts of Chinese soldiers trying to encircle his unit decided to move Bravo company which was located near the valley floor and the only road access into the area further up the hillside to protect the battalion’s rear. LTC Stone had turned Hill 677 into a virtual Canadian island surrounded by a sea of Chinese soldiers. Throughout the remaining daylight of April 24th and into the night the Chinese continued to attack the Canadian positions with no success. The commanders of the Chinese units attacking the Canadian lines requested additional manpower to over run the Canadians. Additional Chinese troops that had been pursuing the Australians along the eastern hillsides of the valley came off the hills and began to wade across the Kapyong River to launch an overwhelming assault on the PPCLI’s Eastern flank. LTC Stone seeing the masses of Chinese soldiers fording the Kapyong River in the moonlight called in an artillery strike. Due to their position the Canadian’s communications lines had not been snapped by the retreating South Koreans. The New Zealand artillery pounded the advancing Chinese soldiers that were exposed in the open river valley. The Chinese soldiers that survived the artillery barrage advanced up the eastern hillside where they were met with overwhelming Canadian machine gun fire.

While the Chinese were launching their attack on the East another large Chinese force pressed their attack on the PPCLI’s Western flank by infiltrating along a high saddle that connected to the ridge line that PPCLI’s Delta Company occupied. Unlike the eastern attack, the Chinese forces in the west were attacking from only a slightly lower elevation than the Canadians and had not been degraded by artillery fire before launching their attack. Hundreds of Chinese soldiers poured into the Canadian defensive lines. The fighting became so desperate that the Delta Company commander called in New Zealand artillery fire on his own position. Artillery rained down on the Canadian position. The artillery fire suppressed the Chinese attackers enough for the Canadians to reestablish their defensive lines and begin directing artillery fire on the advancing Chinese units outside of the Canadian lines.

That night, the mighty Chinese Army that had caused an entire 10,000 man ROK Army division to retreat a day prior, had given their best effort to destroy one Canadian battalion and the Canadians did not budge. The heroic defense of Hill 677 allowed the withdrawing Australians and the American tank company to reorganize and rearm behind the Middlesex Regimental lines. At dawn on April 25, 1951 an Australian counterattack led by the American tanks slammed into the eastern flank of the Chinese forces. As the battle continued to rage the surrounded Canadian commander LTC Stone radioed in a resupply request since his men were running short of supplies and ammunition. In an amazing feat of logistical brilliance six hours later an American resupply plane from Japan flew over the Canadian lines and air dropped in fresh stocks of supplies and most importantly ammunition.

The newly resupplied Canadians combined with the Australian and American counterattack was too much for the Chinese to overcome. Their defeat at Kapyong combined with their additional defeat by the British and American units during the Battle of the Imjim led to overall failure of the Chinese Spring Offensive of 1951 to capture Seoul. If it wasn’t for the leadership of LTC J.R. Stone and his brave men from Canada holding Hill 677 the Chinese may have captured Seoul and that would have possibly led to an embarrassing cease fire where the North Korean communists controlled the South Korean capitol.  The modern existence of the Republic of Korea would not have been possible without their current capitol city of Seoul. The Canadians had 10 soldiers killed in action and 23 wounded after the battle, while over an estimated thousand Chinese corpses littered the hillsides from the combined Canadian, Australian, and American defenders. For their actions during the Battle of Kapyong the second battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment including their attached American tank company were awarded the prestigious US Presidential Unit Citation.

Birth of the Commonwealth Division and the Holding of the Imjim River Line

After the Battle of Kapyong the remainder of the Canadian forces had arrived in Korea after completing their initial training at Ft. Lewis, Washington. They were at first assigned to the US 25th Infantry Division and participated in a number of battles to shore up the UN frontline positions just North of the 38th parallel. By August of 1951 the entire Canadian brigade was consolidated into the newly formed British Commonwealth Division. The British Commonwealth Division was assigned the task of holding and patrolling the lower Imjim River as cease fire negotiations dragged on for two more years. During this time the Chinese had challenged the Commonwealth Division a number of times, but just like during the Spring Offensive of 1951 the Commonwealth forces held their ground until the cease fire was signed. Today the strategic, sliver of land on the North side of the lower Imjim River held by the Republic of Korea that borders the DMZ was only made possible by the blood, sweat, and tears of the brave men of the Commonwealth Division.

In total 26,791 Canadian soldiers participated in the Korean War. Of those soldiers 1,558 soldiers were wounded and 516 Canadians were killed fighting for the freedom of the Korean people.

Note: You can read more of the ROK Drop featured series Heroes of the Korean War at the below link:

US soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines have been spending Christmas in Korea for over 50 years.  This year is no different, but no Christmas in Korea was as desperate as during the Korean War.  However, even during the dark days of the Korean War US military personnel still found ways to celebrate Christmas:

Men of Co "B", 4th Signal Bn, X US Corps, prepare to decorate the Christmas tree at Bn HQ. Korea. 11 December 1951.

This Christmas remember not only the brave US military personnel of the Korean War, but also all the US military personnel away from home this Christmas.  I hope everyone has a Merry Christmas and a Happy Holidays.

France’s Impact on the Korean War

After the North Koreans invaded South Korea in June of 1950 an emergency session of the United Nations was convened to gather military support for the Republic of Korea. 16 countries from the United Nations offered military aid that fell under United States command. The total international force of all 16 countries combined only equaled one tenth of the US military’s contribution to the defense of Korea with many of the international soldiers being rear echelon types. So the actual amount of combat soldiers was much lower.

However, countries that did offer combat soldiers usually sent their best. England, Australia, New Zeland, and Canada all sent units that went on to fight heroically in great battles such as The Battle of Kapyong and The Battle of the Imjim. Sword wielding Turkish and Thai soldiers were also highly respected for their combat skills. However, out of all the international soldiers sent to fight in the Korean War, one battalion to me sticks out more than all the others. This is due partly to their combat record and also to the reputation and personality of their commander. That unit is the French Battalion de Coree under the command of the then Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Monclar.

The French Battalion consisted of 39 officers, 172 non-commissioned officers and more than 800 enlisted personnel, the battalion arrived at Pusan on November 30, 1950. During the war 3,421 French soldiers would fight in Korea.

One battalion of soldiers may seem like a small contribution from a country as large and wealthy as France, but you need to look at the historical context of those times. France was deeply involved in heavy combat in Indochine against communists insurgents there, then they had a insurgency in Algeria to combat, plus military commitments to secure their colonies in Africa. Obviously France was spread very thin and could only afford the one battalion. However, the one battalion they did send was an all volunteer battalion composed of some of their top soldiers led by France’s best commander Ralph Monclar.

Legendary French Foreign Legionaire Ralph Monclar

Now why would their best soldiers volunteer to go fight in Korea? First of all, many French soldiers were still embarrassed by the performance of the French military during World War II. This was an opportunity on an international stage to show that World War II was just a fluke and that the French were back. You had others that simply hated communists. Some fought simply for the glory, others were in it for the money since the battalion’s volunteers were payed quite well. Then you had some that volunteered because they had already been to the hot steamy jungles of Indochine and the cold winters of France and figured that Korea would be a nice year around temperate Mediterranean climate since the 38th parrallel runs through the Mediterranean Sea. How wrong those guys were.

The commander of the battalion, Raoul Charles Magrin-Vernerey, who in World War II shortened his name to Ralph Monclar to be more understandable to Allied forces, was actually a 3 star general before the war and voluntarily took a demotion to Lieutenant Colonel to lead the battalion. He was a veteran of World War I where he was wounded seven times and received eleven awards for valor. After World War I, he was left 90% disabled from his wounds. He was sent to Syria to heal and up and lead soldiers there. By 1924 he was fully recovered and was selected for the French Foreign Legion and led soldiers in Morrocco, the Middle East, and Vietnam. During World War II Monclar and 500 French soldiers joined the Free French forces in England. They went on and fought and defeated the Italian Axis forces in Eritrea. He was on the verge of retirement in 1950 when he volunteered to lead the French battalion in Korea.

Here is how one infantry company commander CPT Ansil Walker, remembered LTC Monclar:

The French soldiers were volunteers from Legion garrisons in Africa and other parts of the world. Their leader was a battle-scarred veteran of the Legion who led them in battle wearing his monocle, a beret, a bright red scarf–and using a cane to compensate for his limp. Sixty-year-old Raoul Monclar, as he called himself, had given up his three-star general’s rank and his true name of Magrin-Venery and had reverted to the rank of lieutenant colonel, since general was too high a rank for a battalion commander. Now, with a nom de guerre and the proper rank to lead a volunteer battalion in combat under the U.N. flag, he and his 1,000-man force had become Colonel Freeman’s “Fourth Battalion.” “This is my finest hour,” Monclar declared.

During the Korean War the French battalion was task organized under the 23rd Infantry Regiment which fell under the US 2nd Infantry Division. The 2ID is the lone US Army Division remaining in defense of Korea to this day. A true legacy of the Korean War. The French Battalion would remain with the 23rd Regiment until hostilities ended on July 27, 1953 with the signing of the Armistice Agreement. During this time the French Battalion would participate in many notable, bloody battles.

The 23rd Regiment was commanded by Colonel Paul Freeman. Freeman and Monclar would become quick friends. It must of felt strange for Freeman to be commanding such a legendary combat veteran as Monclar who had just a few months earlier had been a 3 star general. These two men would be key leaders in three very important battles that would cement their friendship in blood; the Battles Wonju, the Twin Tunnels, and Chipyong-ni.

During the Twin Tunnels battle on January 30, 1951, in the Kumdang Chon Valley, Monclar actually led a company of his men up Hill 453 to secure the northern flank of the regiment. COL Freeman actually commented that the French company was slow in securing the hill because of Monclar. Freeman wanted Monclar to stay behind with the rest of his battalion but Monclar insisted on leading his men up the hill himself. Keep in mind that Monclar is at the time 59 years old with many injuries and prior bullet wounds leading his men up this large mountain. It shows what kind of shape the guy was in for his age. The French company was attacked on February 2nd by an entire regiment of Chinese. Monclar ordered them to fix bayonets and charge the Chinese. Despite heavy odds the Frech drove the Chinese forces back into full retreat off of Hill 453.

Picture of the modern day village of Chipyong-ni.

On the 11-14 February 1951 the 23rd Regiment was ordered to defend the city of Chipyong-ni at all costs against 6 Chinese divisions. The odds were stacked against the regiment 10-1 but 8th Army Commanding General Matthew Ridgeway was determined to make a stand against the advancing Chinese who had won every battle since entering the war and Chipyong-ni was going to be the place. The entire regiment was completely surrounded by the Chinese so the soldiers dug in and prepared for the up coming onslaught.

Chinese positions were located on the hills seen in the distance from the French positions at Chipyong-ni.

The Chinese attacked the night of February 13, 1951 against the defensive perimeter the French Battalion manned. The Chinese during the war liked to blow horns and bang drums to command troops and also for psychological impact against the UN forces. When the Chinese began their bugle calls and drumming to start their attack, the French soldiers began blowing their own air horns and yelling back at them. The French were actually looking forward to a fight and couldn’t wait. When a Chinese platoon attacked the French line, a squad of French soldiers fixed bayonets and charged them. The Chinese platoon had the French squad outnumbered 3-1 but they turned and ran after seeing the French squad charge them with bayonets.

Small hill where the French positions at Chipyong-ni were located.

Here is how another company commander remembers the Chinese assault on the French lines:

The enemy soldiers formed one hundred or two hundred yards in front of the small hill which the French occupied, then launched their attack, blowing whistles and bugles, and running with bayonets fixed. When this noise started, the French soldiers began cranking a hand siren they had, and one squad started running toward the Chinese, yelling and throwing grenades far to the front and to the side. When the two forces were within twenty yards of each other the Chinese suddenly turned and ran in the opposite direction. It was all over within a minute. After this incident it was relatively quiet in the rice paddies near the road cut.

This is how CPT Walker recalled the French actions that day:

A noisy party of Chinese seemed about to fall upon the French in the west. Hearing the preparations, the legionnaires leaped out of their positions screaming a battle cry, fixing bayonets as they charged, and cranking a shrieking Chinese siren of their own. They set upon the surprised and terrified enemy. Survivors turned to escape, only to be tackled, caught, and hauled back by the French as prisoners of war.

The heroic French defense would set the tone for the rest of the defenders of Chipyong-ni that day.

During the battle Monclar and Freeman would move from foxhole to foxhole encouraging soldiers and dodging bullets at the same time. They were very much lead by example type of commanders who did not want to be seen hiding in the rear during a tough fight. The Battle of Chipyong-ni was ferocious and bloody but it proved to be a turning point for UN forces in the war after the 23rd Regiment and the French decisively defeated the Chinese offensive at Chipyong-ni.

The word of the Chinese defeat spread throughout the front lines of the 8th Army and it proved that the Chinese were not invincible and could be decisively defeated. However, this victory would not have been possible without the French Battalion and their legendary commander Ralph Monclar.

Monument to US and French forces that fought in the Battle of Chipyong-ni.

The battalion after Chipyong-ni went on to fight in other pivotal battles in the Korean War including Hongchon and Heartbreak Ridge. In the weeks following Chipyong-ni many of those wild French soldiers that held the line Chipyong-ni would perish in the hills of Hongchon. The French had 40 soldiers killed and 200 wounded in the capturing of a 1000 meter high Chinese fortified hill in -30C temperatures that would eventually open the road for the 8th Army across the 38th parrelell. At Heartbreak Ridge that fall of 1951 another 60 of these brave Frenchmen would die in one month of fighting on the isolated ridgeline.

For their heroics during the Korean War, the French Battalion received three United States Presidential Unit citations, for the battle of the Twin Tunnels, Chipyong-ni, and Hongchon. During the Korean War the French Battalion had 287 soldiers killed in action, 1,350 wounded in action, 7 missing in action, and 12 become prisoners of war. The name of the dead French soldiers can seen today on the wall at the Korean War Memorial in Yongsan commemorating the dead from all the countries that participated in the Korean War. The battalion proved the French was a capable fighting force and won back some of the prestige the French military had lost from World War II not to mention helping to secure the freedom of this now thriving democracy of the Republic of Korea.

General Ridgeway best summed up the actions of the French Battalion during the Korean War with these words given to a joint session of the US Congress in 1952:

I shall speak briefly of the 23rd US Infantry Regiment, Colonel Paul L. Freeman commanding, [and] with the French Battalion. Isolated far in advance of the general battle line, completely surrounded in near-zero weather, they repelled repeated assaults by day and night by vastly superior numbers of Chinese. They were finally relieved. I want to say that these American fighting men, with their French comrades-in-arms, measured up in every way to the battle conduct of the finest troops America and France have produced throughout their national existence.

However the glory this battalion won back for the French would be short lived. After the Armistice Agreement was signed effectively ending the Korean War, the French Battalion was reassigned to Indochine to battle the communist insurgency. The battalion was eventually completely destroyed in a series of ambushes along the infamous Highway 1 which ran parrallel to the coast of Vietnam and was dubbed the Street Without Joy. Though the French Battalion found no joy in Vietnam they did find honor from their actions in Korea.

Note: You can read more of the ROK Drop featured series Heroes of the Korean War at the below link:

LTC Bateman who took the AP to task for their flawed article about the No Gun-ri article during the Korean War, has been one of the central figures in taking the AP to task once again for flawed reporting in Iraq.  Bateman’s latest article is about the flawed AP reporting of the “Jamil Hussein” controversy can be found over at Media Matters. 

Here is what he had to say about his prior experience dealing with the AP after uncovering the flaws in the No Gun-ri article:

In early 2001 the AP called my boss at work (an Army colonel) and tried to get my research (and book) about events that occurred at a place called No Gun Ri, in the summer of 1950, stopped. I was teaching History at West Point at the time. In effect their efforts were an attempt to have my career ended through an adverse report by my boss. Why would they do this? Well, because my research collided with that of the mighty AP. (Cue the irony bell) Because of information I had uncovered about an AP story which dealt with an event of military history, information that revealed that the AP had been completely duped by at least one fraud (and perhaps as many as three), the AP was not happy with me. The AP would not admit that there were any problems, though, and insisted everything was just fine. They chose to counterattack rather than re-examine. When their efforts to coerce my boss into squelching me failed miserably, they contacted my publisher and tried to censor me that way. Again, they did all of this rather than admit that their story had serious problems. The irony of the largest news organization in all of human history attempting to silence an individual soldier is almost too much to believe.

Here is what LTC Bateman had to say about the latest Jamil Hussein controversy:

The AP, I should note, in their counterattack against those who questioned their story and sources, said, "It’s awfully easy to take pot shots from the safety of a computer keyboard thousands of miles from the chaos of Baghdad." The AP executive who said that did so from New York City, but ya know what? Unlike that AP editor, I know something about Baghdad. Having lived in Iraq for a year (returning this past February, if you all recall), and knowing Baghdad well, one additional thing that has blown my mind about this, and the silence from the majority of the media (except E&P, which is covering the story well), is a simple element of geography.

The AP cites their source as being an officer in the Yarmouk district of Baghdad. Fine. Most people in the U.S. and the world don’t know Baghdad’s geography. But the question that hit me is "why is somebody in Yarmouk the main quoted source (originally) for a story about events in Hurriyah?"

Yarmouk is a neighborhood on the north side of what many people know as "Route Irish." Between Yarmouk and Hurriyah neighborhood are the districts of Al Andalous and Al Mansoor (parallel w/ each other), above that is Al Mutanabbi, and above that is Al Urubah … before you get to Hurriyah. It’s more than 3 miles away. Now for country folk like me, 3 miles isn’t but spitting distance. But in a city of 7 million, like NYC or Baghdad, 3 miles is a huge distance.

In other words, in going to their "normal" source for this story, the AP went to the equivalent of a Brooklyn local police precinct for a story that occurred in northern Yonkers! Hello? What would a cop in Brooklyn know about a crime in Yonkers? That’s what doesn’t make sense to me. (And why didn’t the AP reveal, until challenged, that this source was not from the district where the events allegedly occurred, or even from a neighboring district, but is from a moderately distant part of this 7-million-person city?)

To make things even more interesting is that Michelle Malkin has agreed to go to Baghdad with former CNN head honcho Eason Jordan to look for Jamil Hussein.  It will be interesting to see how the AP is going to cover their tracks this time.

The Associated Press of course:

THE most powerful media institution in all of human history is the Associated Press. Its news feed is ubiquitous – used, directly or indirectly, by every U.S. newspaper and TV news program and a vast number of foreign ones, too. AP maintains the largest world-wide coverage, and its reader base is nearly immeasurable. Unfortunately, and repeatedly of late, this behemoth has not only been getting it wrong – but increasingly refuses to acknowledge any wrongdoing.

Instead, acting more like a politician or the mega-corporation that it is, the AP crew spins, obfuscates and attacks. Now they’re at it again in Iraq.

I have got direct experience of this – from challenging the AP’s seriously flawed 1999 “scoop” about the massacre near the South Korean village of No Gun Ri during the opening days of the Korean War.

Bad things did happen at No Gun Ri, of this there can be no doubt. My own research and other historians’, as well as the joint U.S.-Korean government investigation, confirms that a tragedy occurred – there were civilians who were killed there, by our side, and that was wrong.

But the AP’s sensationalistic story painted it as a deliberate massacre, done with machine guns at extremely close range.

The most sensational account started in the 57th paragraph of the 3,448-word story, sourced to one Edward Daily. As AP told it, Daily was the only soldier at No Gun Ri who directly received orders from his officers to turn his water-cooled .30 caliber machinegun on the civilians and shoot them down in cold blood at point-blank range.

Daily’s account was chilling. It was also – as AP should have known – a fantasy.

The AP story took at face value Daily’s claims that he was a combat infantryman who won a battlefield commission just a few days after the events at No Gun Ri, and had been awarded the Distinguished Cross and three Purple-Hearts.

In reality, he was an enlisted mechanic in an entirely different unit, nowhere near No Gun Ri. He had fabricated his biography and credentials as well as his entire account of the events at No Gun Ri.

When I later confronted AP editors with the facts and records that showed their source Daily to be a fraud, they blew me off. What would a historian know about this topic after all, or a soldier?

The AP didn’t issue a retraction, or even attempt to reinvestigate; and it certainly didn’t withdraw the story from the Pulitzer competition. Instead, it attacked the messenger.

Make sure you read the rest of the article.

Robert Bateman wrote the book, No Gun-ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident, that exposed much of the sloppy reporting by the AP in their No Gun Ri story and lays out a very strong case of what happened at No Gun-ri based on physical evidence. Due to his efforts, Bateman had to withstand an AP attack on him for exposing their sloppy reporting.

I’m sure Bateman is looking on with some personal satisfaction as the AP has been caught yet again sensationalizing the news. If you haven’t read “Who is Jamil Hussein?” yet, than you have been missing out because you really should. The AP No Gun-ri reporting aided the North Korean enemy in a limited manner by helping to mobilize public opinion in South Korea against the US military, but the Jamil Hussein controversy is the AP directly taking news reports straight from the enemy and reporting it as fact for two years! This would be funny if it wasn’t so serious.

HT: MM

From the Hanky:

 The Nogeun-ri civilian massacre, a much chronicled event in 1950 that divulged one of the most grueling scenes of the Korean War, has hit bookstores in South Korea and is to advance to Europe in the form of a cartoon book.

Nogunri Story Volume 1, a 612-page hard-cover illustration by Park Kun-woong, is the latest art work on the tragedy in South Korea where efforts to remember it have gained momentum in recent years through documentaries, theater plays, a novel and a movie.

“It’s a history we should remember. If we forget, it will repeat over and over. There is an idea that usually goes around that during the war we can kill people. I want to break this notion,” Park said.

Based on a novel by Chung Eun-yong, a survivor of the incident who lost his two children to it, the cartoon opens with rural scenes of Nogeun-ri (also spelled as Nogunri), Yeongdong County, North Chungcheong Province, where a little boy plays with his sister floating a paper boat on a village stream. Soon, the village people receive an order from U.S. soldiers to leave their homes in advance of North Korean communists and, during their toilsome evacuation, U.S. warplanes appear and strafe hundreds of them as they walk along a railroad track. Survivors cornered under the railroad bridge are machine-gunned.

The mythology of Nogun-ri continues.  I have my own series about what happened at Nogun-ri that can be read here.  For some good debate go through the comments section in this Marmot’s Hole posting where I lay out many of my viewpoints.  The bottom line on this is that I higly recommend that everyone read all the information out there and make your own opinion.  Don’t listen to the propaganda merchants such as the people making this comic book.

The massacre did happen but what is in dispute are the numbers of dead and the motivations behind what happened.

The Korean War is known as the Forgotten War and now is becoming the Rewritten War especially now with this comic book release and with so many Korean War veterans now passing away they can’t even defend themselves anymore as a mythology of them being war criminals is being created.

HT: Yeolchae

Happy Thanksgiving everyone. Here is just a short story from a website with a number of stories from veterans deployed overseas during the holidays. Remember to keep all the US military personnel deployed overseas today in your prayers this Thanksgiving:

Bill Shepard of Plymouth, US Army, Korea: 

“I came back home after the Second World War and then was recalled during the Korean War. It was a shock — I hadn’t even really told my new wife that I was still in the Reserves…
“I wrote a letter home from Korea on Thanksgiving Day, November 22, 1951, that my wife has saved. You can see by the letter :
Am so full I can hardly move! We just finished eating a huge turkey dinner with all the trimmings. I’ll enclose the menu. Typical Army — feast or famine, but today we had the feast.
We were up on the front lines eating cold K rations and then suddenly we go to the rear for Thanksgiving dinner, and then right back to the front line!”

The Marmot’s Hole is reporting that a Korean film about the events of the No Gun-ri tragedy has been completed:

After many news reports and documentaries about Nogeun-ri came out, director Lee Sang-woo felt obliged to make a fictional film to tell the story. He wanted to ask the U.S. government whether there was no other way than war, a question still relevant today.

“Writing the scenario, I asked myself what story I have to tell. This is not going to be about the incident, not the event, but it’s going to be about the people. It is going to tell the relationships that people had in the small community and how intimate and beautiful they were, and ask them (the U.S. military) if they knew what they were doing. They were destroying these beautiful human beings, Lee said after shooting the film’s last scene in Sunchang, South Jeolla Province, early this week.

Expect another anti-American hatefest film much like Welcome to Dongmakgol that drew record Korean audiences with it’s story of North and South Korean soldiers joining together to kill Americans in order to save a rural village during the Korean War.

Why do I think it will be an anti-American hatefest film? Just look at what the Yonhap article says about the No Gun-ri tragedy:

Cows plowing rice farms, children bathing in a nearby stream and elderly men playing chess on a lazy afternoon — this was life in Nogeun-ri, Yeongdong County, central South Korea, before a nightmarish event occurred in July, 1950.

The incident came without warning on the 31st day of the Korean War. The sky split open as U.S. warplanes appeared and strafed hundreds of villagers walking along a railroad track. They were leaving their homes under a directive from retreating U.S. soldiers in the advance of North Korean communists.

Survivors, cornered under a railroad bridge at Nogeun-ri, were indiscriminately machine-gunned. Out of about 500 villagers, only 25 remained, the witness and families of the victims say.

As usual the Korean media gets the whole incident wrong from the start. A theme in recent Korean movies is that life in rural villages was some kind of idealistic paradise until the big, bad Americans come and ruined it. If anyone wants a good cinematic example of what life before, during, and after the Korean War was like in rural Korean villages than I encourage you to see the excellent Korean movie The Taebak Mountains. Watch this movie and then compare it to the crap that is Dongmakgol. The people in these villages were dirt poor and life was hard which made many of these villages agreeable towards communism and uprise against the South Korean government including villages in the No Gun-ri area.

Also the villagers were not evacuated by US soldiers and without a doubt they were not strafed by US aircraft during the No Gun-ri timeframe as the Yonhap article claims.  Finally 500 people did not die at No Gun-ri, maybe 50 at best. How do I know all of this? Read my series of postings that I did last year on this very subject. The evidence is overwhelming about what really happened at No Gun-ri but when Pulitzer Prizes and millions of dollars in compensation money are at stake, who cares about the truth?