Tweet of the Day: Is the Lee Administration Targeting X Accounts?

Well, of course he is. And evry other wannabee despot.

“It’s interesting that many of his supporters’ active X accounts are based in China. The same was recently revealed about the Japanese prime minister, Takaichi. Surprising.”

There is a clear and well-documented network of coordinated accounts, seemingly originating in or connected with China, that have been active in spreading criticism of Takaichi and pushing narratives that align with Chinese strategic interests. There are no pro-Takaichi Chinese campaigns, as should be fully expected.

The situation with Lee Jae‑myung is a bit more complex, as there appears to be some Chinese based support but not nearly as organized as the anti-Takaichi campaign.

Based on the current situation, I feel Lee Jae-myung is between a rock and a hard place. For economic reasons, he must use a diplomatic attitude to not anger China while protecting Korea from inevitable Chinese encroachment.

At this time, China’s economic relations with Korea is good and I see no signs of Chinese influence, so I have nothing to complain about.

Based on Lee Jae-myung’s past speaking, I was very skeptical and critical. But in watching his action, it is almost like he talked leftist-socialost-globalist smack to get elected but then acted quietly as a Korean nationalist.

I am not emotionally attached to this opinion so I would welcome examples of how President Lee has hurt Korea or facilitated damaging foreign influenced.

“The situation with Lee Jae‑myung is a bit more complex..”

You say it’s complex, but offer no depth of rationale..

No problem. I will be more clear.

The situation with Japan is simple. Takaichi talks smack about China and China has an organized internet campaign to talk smack about her. This is all in the open.

It is more complex with Korea. Lee speaks nicely about China and even does a few symbolic action of minor effect and China doesn’t really have an organized pro-Lee campaign. What little there is seems quite informal… on the level of Korea Things.

“At this time, China’s economic relations with Korea is good and I see no signs of Chinese influence, so I have nothing to complain about.

Based on Lee Jae-myung’s past speaking, I was very skeptical and critical. But in watching his action, it is almost like he talked leftist-socialost-globalist smack to get elected but then acted quietly as a Korean nationalist.

I am not emotionally attached to this opinion so I would welcome examples of how President Lee has hurt Korea or facilitated damaging foreign influenced.”

I’m not sure if you’re Korean or not, most likely not..

I am not. But I have been here long enough my interests and the interests of Korea align very much… perhaps more than America at this time. Fortunately, Korean and American interests overlap so much that I don’t need to make a choice… and hope I never do.

“but there are many examples of Chinese influence in South Korea. Without getting into too much detail as you can research for yourself on the interweb (if you can’t get good data or info, let me know..), I’ll outline top line issues for now:

1. Free no-visa entry for ONLY Chinese people

Korea has free no-visa entry for LOTS of countries. As I understand, for China, it is only for Jeju. This appears to be good tourism policy rather than a transfer of Korean sovereignty.

2. Chinese buying up property like hot cakes all across the country, causing various issues in the dynamics of real estate

Chinese, as well as other foreigners (including myself), have bought property in Korea. It is a very small percentage. It should be monitored but it does not appear to be a threat to Korea right now.

3. Crimes being committed by Chinese, and being let go easily (current gov’t politics > law currently in the country)

I will look into this and find actual stats. I don’t see it as a Chinese government issue. It is an issue with the type of people Korea is letting in to solve labor problems. This needs further consideration but not because it is an existential threat.

4. Giving voting rights to Chinese when this isn’t reciprocated in China for Koreans

Korea allows ALL foreign residents to vote in local elections if they have an F-5 visa and have lived in Korea 3+ years. I fully sympathize that with a big enough voting block, politicians will pander to them (Muslims in the UK) or they can take over entire areas (Mexican in the US). I don’t see the same dynamics in Korea. But, like the Muslims, we must be vigilant.

5. Chinese coming to South Korea and proudly waving their flags and playing their national CCP anthem, marching in the streets of Seoul and Jeju island.. while Koreans can’t fathom to do this in China (one guy actually got their taeguki snatched saying it’s illegal to wave it in China – yes, there’s a video of it)

This is because Korea is a democracy with freedom of speech protections and China is not. This represents a virtue of the Korean system rather than a Chinese takeover.

Another time, I will consider what we need to be looking for.

I suspect we can demonstrate the Korean left has aligned itself with goals damaging to South Korea that are being pushed by Globalists, China, and North Korea, as all their agendas have that in common.

I will consider further.

Joshua Lee, I understand your points.

I don’t (at the moment) fully agree with them all but they are certainly valid enough that I will consider further rather than dismissing them.

Let’s look closely.

You raise some valid concerns. Some of your observations are accurate, and some might benefit from some additional context.

On the political symbolism issue, you’re right that in Korean politics, symbolic gestures toward major powers can be interpreted as “picking sides.” Terms like 친미, 친일, and 친중 are very real categories in the Korean political conversation, and voters often interpret actions through that lens even when the policy itself may be small. So your point that even minor gestures can have political meaning domestically is valid.

At the same time, foreign policy signals are often more ambiguous than they appear in domestic debate. Politicians sometimes make (conflicting) gestures toward multiple countries simultaneously to maintain diplomatic balance rather than to indicate a clear alignment.

President Lee has to maintain good economic relations with China while protecting Korea from their tendency to encroach. At the same time, he has to manage Korean voters who see any concession as a threat to sovereignty.

On the visa-free tourism policy, your clarification about the pilot program for Chinese group tourists is correct. South Korea has run temporary programs allowing visa-free entry for Chinese tour groups in order to boost tourism, particularly after COVID and after previous downturns caused by diplomatic tensions such as the THAAD dispute.

However, programs like this are generally economic measures used by many countries that rely on tourism. They don’t usually imply a strategic shift in foreign policy by themselves. The Jeju visa-free policy also predates the current administration and has existed for many years as a tourism strategy.

Regarding Chinese property purchases, you are correct about one important fact… Chinese nationals account for the largest share of foreign real estate purchases in South Korea. Statistics show they make up roughly 60–70% of foreign buyers. That part of your argument is accurate, and it’s one reason the issue receives political attention.

However, it’s also true that foreign ownership overall remains a very small portion of the Korean housing market, generally around 1% or less of total residential property nationwide.

Because of that, economists debate whether it significantly affects prices or whether it is mostly a symbolic political issue. Still, your fairness argument about reciprocity with China’s property restrictions is one that many Korean politicians and commentators have raised as well, so you’re not alone in that concern.

This brings up silly philosophical questions such as, in the extreme, “Oh, you like reciprocity, well then Koreans cannot engage in self defense when they come to Merica.”

Not a black and white issue and I need to consider it further before making an opinion. As foreign property rights are based on laws and interests, rather than reciprocity, I would guess the advantages and disadvantages of that to Korea rather than what Koreans can do in China should be the focus.

On the citizenship-through-investment point, there is some truth but also a bit of misunderstanding. Korea does have an investment residency program where foreigners who invest a certain amount (often in designated real estate or funds) can obtain a residency visa that may eventually lead to permanent residency.

However, it does not automatically grant citizenship, and naturalization. Korea still requires additional requirements such as language ability, residency time, and approval by the government. That said, it is fair to say that these programs were partly designed with Chinese investors in mind because they were the largest group participating.

Let’s watch them closely, collect solid facts and statistics, calculate trends, and discuss further.

For local voting rights, your description of the concern is understandable, but the current rule applies specifically to permanent residents (F-5 visa holders) who have lived in Korea for several years. This system was introduced partly as a reciprocity measure after Koreans living in Japan gained some local voting participation. The number of foreign voters remains very small relative to the Korean electorate, so at present it hasn’t had measurable political influence, but your broader point about democratic reciprocity between countries is an interesting one that occasionally comes up in policy debates.

Again, this is philosophy. Should all residents have a say in how they are governed? Does that extend to those not native to the system? I have no answer.

Overall, I think your concerns reflect a broader anxiety that many countries have about economic influence, reciprocity, and fairness in globalization, especially when dealing with large neighboring powers. Those are legitimate questions to discuss. At the same time, the available data suggests that most of these issues in Korea are still relatively limited in scale, even though they can become politically sensitive.

My biggest concern is keeping good economic relations with China and America while not giving them too much control over anything.

(Korea and America’s relationship has been highly beneficial for a long, long time.)

So I’d say your arguments highlight some real concerns, but the overall situation is probably less dramatic than it sometimes appears in political discussion.