Korean Atomic Bomb Survivors Want American Apology

At the time, the situation was VERY different from now. People have mentioned the fire bombings of Tokyo, they have not mentioned the fire bombings of nearly every major Japanese city on the island. The US air force incinerated between 50% and 80% of the 30 largest cities in Japan, (as high as 94% in a couple cases)and many smaller ones as well. USAF intel reports from September 1945 note that it is a good thing the war ended when it did, as the Bomber command was running out of targets. Mass bombing of cities was simply the order of the day, in Japan and in Europe. The mass ‘city-buster’ raids at the end of the war in Europe were intended to annihilate German cities, to ‘de-house’ workers and civilians and cause a mass uprising against the German government. The only reason more German cities were not annihilated was because the German air force put up more of a fight until the end of 1944, and the weather over Germany was prohibitive. Still, Hamburg, Dresden, Cologne, Nuremburg, Berlin, and many other cities were destroyed from the air, creating huge firestorms where the oxygen caught fire and flames lept over a mile into the air.

Japan has no significant air force left in 1945, much better weather and cities made primarily out of wood and paper, not stone, so the USAF went at the country with a vengeance. They used tactics of mass area bombing started in 1917, and used since then by Germany, Spain, Russia, Italy, Canada, Britain, Australia, Turkey, France, the US and Japan itself since. Every nation in the world, allied and axis, accepted the bombing of cities as a part of modern warfare, and every nation that could practiced it. Britain and the US got very good at it, but Germany and Japan had had a lot of practice as well. Post-war studies would show that the effect on civilian morale was not what people expected, that in fact morale strengthened under this aerial assault, but that was not known at the time.

The ruling cabinet in the Japanese government was formed of three groups, civilians, naval and Army Officers. The civilians were divided, some wanted peace, some wanted war. There was no consensus. The Navy was disgraced, and it tended to follow the decisions of the Army. It still had a strong voice, but nowhere near as much as in 1941. Due to its performance in the latter years of the war, it no longer held a voice of power. The Army was unified in its desire for war. It held the strongest voice and had no intention of surrendering. On paper, more than 2/3 of the Japanese army was unharmed and intact in China and Manchuria. In fact the war in China was still going fairly well. While most knew that it would be impossible to win the war, Japan saw opportunities for an honourable settlement, which would allow them to keep their Chinese possessions. The plan was for a single massive attack against any US or Allied forces landing on the homeland. Japan had over 7000 aircraft stockpiled (old and obsolete aircraft mind you) for which ¾ would be given suicide assignments on US coastal fleets. The actual effect of the counter push would have had on landing US forces is of course unknown. The Japanese correctly guessed the landing spot of the US, but most of the defences would have been severely damaged by shore and naval bombardment. Previous estimates show that Kamikaze pilots had about a 5-10% hit rate. Even if you lower that considering the poor quality of the remaining Japanese pilots, that is still a potential for a lot of damage.

But there was no chance of surrender. The Japanese ambassador to Holland decided on his own initiative to try and broker a peace with the US on behalf of his government. The Japanese government, upon hearing this, cut off his status, and sentenced him to death as a traitor in absentia. A further series of pro-peace officials were arrested and imprisoned or executed in June of 1945. The Japanese refused to mention the Potsdam declaration in the Media, or discuss it in cabinet past a few dismissive comments. We know this because we have the cabinet transcripts from the Japanese government at the time.

The US on the other hand has its own problems. Morale was low, as many troops do not want to get into such a bloody conflict, and many just came from the long struggle in Europe. Worse the points system means that the most experienced NCOs in the US army all got to go home, and a critical component of US combat effectiveness was lost. The home front was tired of war and demanding a return to a civilian economy and there was even the fear that continued resistance in the East might cause problems involving renewed resistance in Europe. Casualty figures for the invasion of Japan are as high as 1 million casualties (not dead), though more realistic estimates are for about 500-600,000 casualties, meaning about 150,000 to 200,000 dead. That of course does not include the incalculable slaughter of Japanese soldiers and civilians in the maths.

So the bomb is discussed. Originally designed for use in Europe to counter a possible Nazi bomb, the possibility of deploying it against Japan comes up. Several scenarios are discussed: Use of the bomb to support a landing; use of the bomb as a bloodless demonstration of power, say over Tokyo harbour, or use of the bomb against remaining Japanese targets.

The first option is dismissed because it does not make a very good tactical weapon, and the same support could be achieved with mass conventional bombing, and without the relatively misunderstood boogeyman of radiation to contend with. The second is dismissed because the ‘demonstration’ would be limited to those who happened to be nearby and watching the flash, and the power of the bomb would not be understood simply by seeing a flash in the sky.

So the decision was taken to hit Japanese targets in the hope of forcing surrender. Interestingly, the bomb was not dropped on Tokyo for several reasons, but the main one was that Tokyo was so huge, and the centre of the city was already so gutted (the March 3-5th firebombing destroyed 26 square km in the centre of the city) that the effects of the atomic bomb would be muted. Hiroshima was chosen because of the naval academy and command stationed there, and the fact that it was one of the very few cities relatively undamaged from bombing so far in the war.

So they dropped the Bomb. The effect upon Japan was limited. There was no mention of it in the press, and no unusual activity in the cabinet on the 6th or 7th. When army representatives visited the site 24 hours later, they described it as being ‘not as bad as the centre of Tokyo’. They also did not believe it was an atomic bomb. A common theory was that the US had dropped hundreds of thousands of strips of magnesium, and then ignited them all at once. Most importantly, everyone agreed that the US would not be able to duplicate this feat. There was NO talk of a surrender.

2 Days later, the forgotten even occurred, which nobody ever seems to mention for some reason. The USSR invaded Manchuria on 9 August 1945. Within 24 hours they had utterly routed much of the Japanese forces. The Red Army, huge, equipped and experienced against the Nazis, faces the Kwangtung army fielding no artillery above 75 mm, few tanks, and those tanks they had with guns no bigger than 50 mm and no modern anti tank weapons. This was a double blow, because the USSR had been the traditional route of diplomatic messages between japan and the Allies, and many regarded the USSR as a benevolent neutral.

This destruction broke the back of the Army in the Ruling cabinet, they were disgraced much like the navy, but they still had the power to veto any legislation, and both army and Navy had the power to dissolve and reform the cabinet at will, a power they had used several times during the war. There was still little talk of peace, in fact the order for the mobilisation of defences against invasion (hardly the act of a surrendering nation) was done the same day as Nagasaki. More time would have made no difference. The public were completely in the dark, and the government held firm to their option of a negotiated surrender.

Nagasaki is more nebulous. A second bomb was required, but this one could have been dropped in a place with less loss of life. Maybe Tokyo harbour. At this point is was just proof that the US could do it again. In response to that I say, maybe, but this is 1945 we are talking about not 2004, and to quote Patton “you don’t win wars by not killing people”. Its not just the 60 years difference, its also the experience of just having survived 6 years of brutal warfare, and 4 years more only 20 years earlier.

So they dropped the Bomb. Again. Also on the 10th, the US delivered another massive conventional bombing raid on Tokyo (another forgotten fact). The cabinet met and after some debate is was decided that Japan would not surrender unconditionally, and that the planned defence of the mainland would continue. Army Minister General Anami (a leading cabinet member) made a loud proclamation on the radio stating that the Japanese would never surrender. That bears repeating for effect: The decision of the Cabinet after the bombing of Nagasaki was NOT to surrender, and this was announced on the radio. At this point, the Emperor, technically head of the cabinet, but traditionally silent, spoke up (for only the second time in his life) and pled for peace. The Cabinet could not disagree, and this gave the Doves in the Cabinet the ammunition they needed to call for immediate surrennder, and the next day Japan was to capitulate.

But it wasn’t over. That night, the Army staged a Coup against the Emperor in order to take him into ‘protective custody’ and reverse his decision to surrender. The coup was a very close thing, but was thwarted when several key generals stayed loyal. The offending officers either killed themselves, or in several cases, got into aircraft for last ditch kamikaze missions against the US. As the announcement of surrender was read by the Emperor on 12 noon on the 15th, there were mutinies in barracks across the country from disbelieving troops, though in most cases it was short or ended by suicide.

Not only was Japan NOT about to surrender, but it is unlikely that they ever would have EVEN AFTER the two bombs, had not the Russians invaded Manchuria. While there is an argument to be made that the second bomb did not need to target Nagasaki, there is no argument against dropping the bombs. Even after these three critical events, the Japanese came very close to continuing the war.