Tag: PEFTOK

Basic Information

• Name: Dionisio Ojeda
• Rank: Lieutenant Colonel
• Country: Philippines
• Notable Battles: Battle of the Yultong, Chinese Spring Offensive
• Korean War Service: Sept. 1950 – June 1951

Background

One of the first United Nations members to answer the call to deploy troops and would go on to make meaningful battlefield contributions to the war effort in Korea was the Philippines. The Philippine government deployed one regimental combat team to fight in the Korean War that became known as the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK). The PEFTOK soldiers arrived in Korea on September 19, 1950 at the port city of Pusan shortly after MacArthur’s successful Incheon Landing Operation that turned the tide of the Korean War.

During the nearly five years PEFTOK was deployed to Korea they participated in a number of heavy combat operations and established themselves a solid reputation as tough, tenacious fighters in the hills of Korea. Much of the tactical skills the Filipino soldiers used in Korea to great effect was honed during their own struggle against tyranny when the Japanese invaded the Philippines and Filipino guerrillas took to the hills to launch attacks against the Japanese. The Filipino military’s guerrilla warfare skills only improved when the military was called on to fight its own communist insurrection occurring in the highlands of the Philippines against the Hukbalahap which were guerrilla fighters aligned with the Philippine Communist Party.

PEFTOK 10th Battalion Combat Team patch

This communist insurgency in the Philippines was the deciding factor for the Filipino President Elpidio Quirino to deploy forces to Korea. President Quirino feared that if Korea fell to the North Koreans then the global communist movement would then be encouraged to aid the Hukbalahap guerrillas fighting to overthrow the national government of the Philippines. President Quirino decided the Philippines had to make a stand against global communist movement and Korea was going to be that place. Here is how President Quirino opened his address to the Filipino soldiers about to deploy to Korea:

“Poor as we are, this country is making a great sacrifice in sending you there, but every peso invested in you is a sound investment for the perpetuation of our liberty and freedom.”

And poor they were because the Filipino government was nearly bankrupt at the time of this deployment due to the destruction of World War II as well as the continuing counterinsurgency struggle against the communist guerrillas in the highlands. Despite this the government was committed to deploying troops to Korea.

Lieutenant Colonel Mariano Azurin Parades the 10th BCT passed Filipino President Elpidio Quirino

The Deployment of the 10th BCT

The military unit that heard this speech before they deployed was the 10th Battalion Combat Team (BCT). The Philippine military rotated combat teams to Korea every year with the 10th BCT being the first unit deployed to the peninsula which subsequently saw the heaviest combat of all the PEFTOK units sent to Korea. The 10th BCT was deployed with three infantry companies, a motorized reconnaissance company that was equipped with light M24 Chaffee tanks, a armored company with no tanks, and its own internal artillery battalion. The Filipinos were promised Sherman tanks from the US, but never received them to field the armored company with. In total the regiment was assigned approximately 1,400 men. An American trained tank commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mariano Azurin was chosen to lead this first PEFTOK unit into a war that would have great ramifications for his country if it was not won.

The 10th BCT was without a doubt a well equipped unit, but the UN command foundly them unprepared for combat in Korea and the unit spent it first weeks in Korea conducting pre-combat training in the city of Miryang. In October 1950, the 10th BCT received their first combat mission and was sent to the village Waegwan, which is the modern day home to the US military installation Camp Carroll. At Waegwan the 10th BCT’s reputation of being hardened anti-communist guerrilla fighters was put to the test. Throughout the hills in this area the Filipino soldiers worked with the US 25th Infantry Division to root out and destroy the remaining communists hiding in the hillsides.

Hunting Communist Guerrillas in the Hills of Korea

Before the Korean War South Korean communist guerrillas reinforced with North Korean infiltrators had tried to overthrow the ROK government and during the Korean War they were responsible for a number of attacks against the rear areas of American forces deployed to Korea. It was estimated that 35,000 communist guerrillas were operating in South Korea’s countryside and ironically enough it was up to a US trained tank commander LTC Azurin to help do something about it. The 10th BCT launched continuous small five man patrols during the day and at night to intercept the guerrillas trying to launch ambushes against UN supply lines in their area. The teams were small enough to avoid detection and sneak up and ambush the small guerrilla cells operating in the hills.

It was during this anti-guerrilla operation the PEFTOK would experience their first casualty with Private Alipio Ceciliano losing his life in defense of the Republic of Korea. However, the operation around Waegwon was a success with the 10th BCT killing large numbers of guerrillas in the hills and keeping the UN supply lines to Seoul open. The UN military leadership would turn to the Lieutenant Colonel Azurin again to lead another anti-guerrilla movement further north.

Example of 10th BCT soldier at Korean War Memorial in Seoul.

In late October LTC Azurin received orders that his men were going to be shipped north to the city of Kaesong to root out guerrillas harassing UN supply lines between Kaesong and Pyongyang. UN forces had moved across the 38th parallel and into North Korea to destroy the last remnants of the North Korean army and needed secure supply lines to support the offensive. LTC Azurin and his men would cross the 38th parallel themselves on October 31, 1950. The Filipinos were transported north by truck to conduct their operations in conjunction with the 65th Infantry which was an infantry regiment from Puerto Rico commanded by Colonel William Harris. The Filipinos were assigned to the 65th Regiment because of the mistaken belief that Filipinos spoke Spanish like the Puerto Ricans. Despite initial communication problems the two units’ leadership spoke enough English to coordinate operations between each other.

It was during this operation to secure the UN supply lines between Kaesong and Pyongyang that the Filipino battalion fought their first battle against a non-guerrilla unit. A battalion of North Korean soldiers ambushed the 10th BCT near the North Korean city of Muidong, but the hardened Filipino soldiers quickly counterattacked and killed 50 of the North Korean soldiers while only losing one Filipino soldier. Lieutenant Colonel Azurin continued his small team patrol tactics in this region to intercept guerrillas operating in the hills. Amazingly one of these small five man patrols was able to capture 77 North Korean soldiers that surrendered to them.

Relieving Colonel Azurin

It was during their anti-guerrilla campaign in North Korea that the bitter Korean winter hit the 10th BCT. The Filipino soldiers in the 10th BCT had never even seen snow before much less the extremely cold temperatures they found themselves in and were not properly equipped to deal with the cold. The 10th BCT was promised that they would receive cold weather gear from the American 24th ID regiment they found themselves working with in North Korea, but none arrived. Colonel Azurin fought bitterly with the American leadership to provide the clothing.

The 10th BCT’s first two commanding officers LTC Mariano Azurin and LTC Dionisio Ojeda.

The 10th BCT would eventually receive their cold weather gear, but not before many Filipino soldiers received cold weather injuries and Colonel Azurin was relieved of his command at the request of the request of Colonel William Harris who accused Azurin of being, “much of a protester and not a doer”. The fight over the cold weather gear was the tipping point to remove Azurin because Colonel Harris had also fought bitterly with Azurin over dividing the 10th BCT from one whole battalion to five separate companies to conduct separate guerrilla operations in five different North Korean towns. Azurin wanted to keep the battalion together so each company could support each other and he could better command and control of them. All indications are that Colonel Azurin was a good man trying to do his best for his soldiers, but as fate would have it, it ended up being a good thing for the 10th BCT to have Azurin relieved. The man who hand picked by Colonel Harris to replace Lieutenant Colonel Mariano Azurin would go on to become a great leader and a legendary hero of the Philippine military during the Korean War. This man was Lieutenant Colonel Dionisio Ojeda.

LTC Ojeda was a World War II veteran who fought on Bataan and Corregidor against the Japanese and was a survivor the Bataan Death March. He was tough, experienced and used to working with Americans which is what the 10 BCT needed at the time.

The Chinese Enter the War

On Thanksgiving of 1950 the Chinese military launch their massive sneak attack against the allied forces which found the PEFTOK soldiers retreating south with the rest of the UN forces to escape the nearly 300,000 marauding Chinese soldiers that were steam rolling down the peninsula.

The 10th BCT retreated with the rest of the UN forces in what became known as, “The Big Bug Out” as soldiers from all the various nations’ armies retreated from the Chinese enemy that in the minds of the soldier fighting them had taken on superhuman characteristics. The truth was that the Chinese were not superhuman and were in fact taking heavy casualties during the offensive sweep south down the peninsula from allied artillery and aerial bombing.

The UN forces were able to strengthen their frontlines just south of Seoul and the 10th BCT ended up spending their first Christmas in Korea in the walled city of Suwon. By February Lieutenant Colonel Dionisio Ojeda and his men of the Filipino 10th BCT were attached to the US 3rd Infantry Division. Following the Chinese defeat at Chipyong-ni by the US 23rd Infantry Regiment with support from the French Battalion, the 3rd ID was tasked to begin an offensive operation against the retreating Chinese forces. The 3rd ID aided by the 10th BCT helped the allies to push the Chinese out of Seoul and across the Imjim River.

The Chinese Spring Offensive

After the offensive operation the allies fortified their positions on the southside of the Imjim River while the Chinese reconsolidated their forces on the north side in preparation of a spring offensive to crush the UN forces once and for all. In April 1951 the 10th BCT was transitioned to the reserve of the US 65th Infantry Regiment, which would be the 2nd time the Filipinos worked with the Puerto Rican unit. The reserve duty was to allow the Filipinos some time to rest after the long offensive operation against the Chinese.

The 10th BCT is located on the above map between Highway 33 and the Imjim River on the north-central front.

However, rest for Lieutenant Colonel Ojeda and his men would not last long as on April 22, 1951 the Chinese launched a massive counterattack dubbed the Chinese Spring Offensive against the allied forces. LTC Ojeda received orders to deploy his men along Highway 33 running to Chorwon to reinforce the allied front lines along the Imjim River. The area they were to reinforce was a ridgeline to the west of the highway and bordered by the Imjim River on the location’s western flank near the city of Yeonchon. On the left flank of the Filipinos the Puerto Ricans had dug themselves in and even further west of the Puerto Ricans was the British 29th Brigade augmented with a Belgian Battalion that were also attached to the US 3rd Infantry Division just like the Filipinos. To the right flank and to the east, the 10th BCT was bordered by the Turkish Brigade that was just recovering from heavy losses inflicted on the brigade by the Chinese during the Battle of Kunu-ri a few months prior. Further to the east of the Turks were units from the US 25th Infantry Division that the Turks were attached to.

Battle of the Yultong

Directly opposite of the Filipino positions were four Chinese division numbering about 40,000 men. The 10th BCT did not receive contact from these Chinese units until just after midnight on April 23rd. The Chinese opened their attack with a heavy artillery barrage before advancing on the Filipino defenders in the darkness of the night which they preferred to fight in. Once the artillery barrage ended it was clear an assault on the 10th BCT’s fortified ridgeline was coming because of the loud noises from the Chinese’s bugles, gongs, and drums that they used to communicate between their units. The first Chinese assault on the 10th BCT position was from the east side of the ridgeline. Baker Company of the 10th BCT successfully defended the east side of the ridgeline and inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese aided with mortar and artillery support from the Filipino artillery battery.

However, during the massive Chinese assault on the east side of the 10th BCT the Chinese were able to push the Turkish Brigade from their positions and began to envelope the eastern flank of the Filipino battalion. LTC Ojeda was aware of the danger to his flank by the Chinese trying to surround Baker Company. To fortify his flank Ojeda organized and led a makeshift unit of the battalion’s clerks and cooks to form a defensive line on Baker Company’s flank. This makeshift unit with help from the M24 light tanks and the battalion’s own internal artillery support, was able to hold off the Chinese.

An M24 “Chaffee” light tank with a 75 mm gun belong to the 10th BCT.

However, the situation only got worse for the 10th BCT as the Puerto Rican 65th Infantry Regiment on their western flank began to fallback from the Chinese attack on their exposed flank because of the withdrawal of the Turks. The Chinese attackers had gone behind the 10th BCT’s lines and attacked the Puerto Ricans. As the Puerto Ricans began to fall back to reconsolidate another defensive line to fight the Chinese from, the Chinese then turned their attention towards the Filipinos. The Chinese began to advance up the exposed Filipino flank and Lieutenant Colonel Ojeda used the men of his tank company that were supposed to receive tanks from the US but didn’t, as infantrymen to stop the Chinese advance. The Chinese began to attack a platoon of soldiers from the Tank Company that had just positioned themselves on a small hill on the 10th BCT’s flank overlooking the Korean village of Yultong.

The platoon was commanded by Lieutenant Jose Artiaga who refused to have his men abandon their positions despite the overwhelming Chinese numbers advancing up the hill at them. The platoon stood and fought heroically against the Chinese. This stubborn stand by Lt. Artiaga and his men bought time for his company commander Captain Conrado Yap to mount a counterattack to save the platoon of soldiers from the Chinese onslaught. Captain Yap led the counterattack against the Chinese and would die in the fight. Likewise his platoon leader Lt. Artiaga would also go down fighting, but the counterattack proved successful in saving the platoon from total annihilation by extracting them from the hill and stopping the Chinese advance from reaching the exposed flank of the battalion.

Picture of CPT Conrado Yap and 1LT Jose Artiaga before they were killed in action during the Battle of the Yultong.

At first light Lieutenant Colonel Ojeda used his light M24 tanks to launch another counterattack against the Chinese who were trying to regroup on the hill they had just ceased from the Filipino defenders at great cost. The Chinese were surprised by the sudden counterattack and the 10th BCT was once again able to drive the Chinese back off the ridgeline.

Despite the success of the counter attack LTC Ojeda found himself with a major problem on the morning of April 23rd; his unit was completely surrounded by the Chinese due to the withdrawal of the units positioned to his left and right flanks that night. Being a soldier from an island nation it was a tad bit ironic that from his battalion’s fortified ridgeline position LTC Ojeda found himself literally as a Philippine island in the middle of a sea Chinese infantry swarming past them. However, to hold this Filipino island, the 10th BCT had 10 soldiers killed, 14 missing, and 26 wounded in action after the battle that night, which wasn’t to bad of a result considering how out manned the battalion had been.

Withdrawal from Yultong

By mid-day Lieutenant Colonel Ojeda’s unit still firmly held the ridgeline and the Chinese had pretty much quit fighting to capture the ridgeline. Instead they continued to flow around the ridge and press their attack against retreating allied units. The commander of the 3rd ID, General Soule saw how his attached Philippine battalion was surrounded and alone, north of his front lines and ordered it to conduct a fighting withdrawal south to link up with the rest of the division. The division had another unit, the Belgian Battalion, that was also surrounded north of friendly lines it was trying to extract as well. General Soule ordered the Puerto Rican 65th Infantry and the 64th Tank Battalion to occupy blocking positions north of the Han-tan River along Highway 33 to cover the withdrawal of both the Belgian Battalion and the 10th BCT. LTC Ojeda led his men off the ridgeline and fought through light Chinese contact before linking up with the allied units positioned at the Han-tan River. The extractions of both the Filipino and Belgian Battalions had been a success.

June 9, 1951 article in the Stars & Stripes newspaper describing a commendation from the 3rd ID commander MG Robert Soule.

Once LTC Ojeda linked up with his American counterparts, he received orders from General Soule to lead a withdrawal south with the 65th Infantry in order to link up with the commander of the British 29th Brigade, Brigadier Tom Brodie in order to fill in gaps in the British unit’s frontline. Starting at 1400 on April 23rd, the 10th BCT led a withdrawal down Highway 33 and then turned down Highway 11 to link up with the British 29th Brigade. However, due to light contact along the way Colonel Ojeda was not able to link up with Brigadier Brodie’s unit until 20:00 that night. Brigadier Brodie figured it would be to difficult for Ojeda to get his men organized and dug in during the night on the brigade’s frontlines and decided to keep the Filipinos in reserve until the next morning.

Rescue of the Gloucestershire Battalion

After the fight on the Battle of the Yultong, the PEFTOK soldiers once again found themselves in the reserve. However, the rest for the Filipinos in the reserve would be short lived as the British Gloucestershire Battalion located on a ridge along the frontlines of the 29th Brigade became surrounded after desperate battle that night. British 29th Brigade Commander Brigadier Tom Brodie, was looking for options to extract the British soldiers from their isolated position and decided to have the 10th BCT’s Commander Lieutenant Colonel Dionisio Ojeda take his men north with a column of British tanks and infantry in order to try and rescue the Gloucestershire Battalion.

April 28, 1951 edition of the Stars & Stripes newspaper features a full page article on the “Fighting Filipinos” of the 10th BCT.

The combined Filipino-British rescue team left at 0730 on April 24th and traveled up Highway 5Y towards the Gloucestershire Battalions positions. However, once the road entered a mountainous valley it became very narrow and uneven. As it turned out the British Centurion tanks were too heavy and wide to use the road and only four light M24 tanks that the 10th BCT had could traverse the road. Once Brigadier Brodie was informed of the problem, he ordered the unit to establish a blocking position approximately 2 miles short of the Gloucestershire Battalion while he decided with his staff how best to proceed to rescue the surrounded battalion.

After conferring by radio with the Gloucestershire Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel James P. Carne, Brigadier Brodie decided that the Gloucesters were too weak to mount a fighting withdrawal and needed an allied unit to clear the Chinese from the surrounding ridgeline in order to save the battalion. Brodie decided to send the 65th Infantry and the 64th Tank Battalions to clear the ridgeline with the Filipinos following behind them to protect their flanks from a Chinese counterattack. The attack was to begin at 0630 on April 25th, which meant that the Gloucesters were going to have to survive yet another night of Chinese attacks on their position.

However, as the Glosters fight on the hill became more desperate Brigadier Brodie decided to see if the Filipinos could be able to extract the surrounded battalion. He ordered Colonel Ojeda to move his unit up the road and see if he could complete the link up with the Gloucestershire Battalion. Ojeda’s tanks moved up the narrow valley and the first tank in his column struck a land mine destroying it. An ambush from entrenched Chinese on the hillsides followed and the Ojeda’s men found themselves in full contact with the enemy. The British centurion tanks down the road could see the ambush taking place and began firing into the hillsides at the Chinese infantrymen. The fire from these tanks allowed Ojeda to get his wounded men extracted from the tank destroyed by the landmine. Ojeda then has the three remaining tanks act as a rear guard as his unit withdrew back down the valley to link up with the British tanks. Colonel Ojeda radioed back to Brigadier Brodie to inform him that there was no way his men could extract the Gloucesters by themselves. They needed help and no help came.

Kamak mountain valley that the PEFTOK soldiers traveled up to try and rescue the Gloucestershire Battalion.

During this fight to relieve the Gloucesters Brodie was informed that the allied leadership had decided to pull the UN forces’ frontline further south to all UN units to reorganize their frontlines. Due to this, the attack the next morning by the 65th Infantry Regiment was called off and only one platoon of tanks from the regiment was assigned to try and breakthrough to the Gloucesters which of course the next morning failed because approximately an entire Chinese division had moved into the valley by this time. On the western side of the ridgeline a combined US-ROK assault had also failed to reach the trapped unit but they were able to rescue a few stragglers that were able to evade the Chinese when they overran their position.

Colonel Ojeda’s unit was also called off from any counterattack and likewise were ordered to redeploy south to the new frontline. Ultimately the rescue of the Gloucestershire Battalion would end unsuccessfully and the unit was completely destroyed with only a 67 men able to make it off the mountain that day with the rest of the 700 man unit either dead or captured. Out of all the units that tried to rescue the Glosters, the 10th BCT came the closest to them by having the Chinese turn back their rescue effort a mere 2 kilometers from the surrounded battalion.

Aftermath of the Chinese Spring Offensive

In an investigation into the loss of the Gloucestershire Battalion, the I Corps Commander General Frank Milburn drew particular attention to how the attack by the LTC Ojeda’s 10th BCT was not followed up on by more allied units to break through the Chinese lines to reach the lost battalion. Colonel Ojeda’s men had opened up a wedge into the Chinese frontlines but without more follow on forces to fight the entrenched Chinese, there was no way the Filipinos could break through themselves. Brigadier Brodie would later explain that he decided not to send more forces to aid the Filipino rescue attempt because he thought the Gloucestershire Battalion could hold out until the next day when his planned operation with the 65th Regiment could rescue them, but the withdrawal order and the fact that the Glosters were in worse shape then Brigadier Brodie believed all combined to cause the loss of the unit. Sadly in the failed attempt to reach the trapped unit, Ojeda had five of his soldiers killed and more wounded by the Chinese.

When the Eighth Army Commander General Matthew Ridgeway read the results of the investigation he concluded the loss of the Gloucestershire Battalion was the fault of Brigadier Brodie not knowing his men. Ridgeway felt Brodie should have known the Glosters commander Lieutenant Colonel Carne had a habit of understating things and should have moved more soldiers in sooner to aid the 10th BCT’s rescue effort.

Overall the Chinese Spring Offensive was a failure and the allies ultimately reclaimed the lost territory with an offensive operation that Lieutenant Colonel Dionisio Ojeda’s 10th Battalion Combat Team participated in. After the battle the allies estimated that 75,000 enemy soldiers died during the Spring Offensive with 50,000 of them dying in the Seoul corridor where the Battle of the Imjim occurred.

The Roman Catholic men of PEFTOK attend mass at the county of Chorwon.

The Chinese would never truly recover from this defeat and after their failed second spring offensive two weeks later the communists initiated ceasefire negotiations after even more heavy losses. The ceasefire negotiations caused the war to turn into a hill top war for the next two years until a final ceasefire had been declared. Without the heroic fighting of LTC Ojeda’s 10th BCT along with the rest of the allied forces that fought tenaciously in the Seoul corridor, the ceasefire may have come much sooner with the communist controlling Seoul and in a position of strength to dictate the terms of the ceasefire. As it turned out the allies were in the position of strength during the ceasefire negotiations in part due to the actions of what the US command began calling the “Fighting Filipinos” of the 10th BCT.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_iZm15cmYSc

Remembering the PEFTOK Soldiers

Lieutenant Colonel Ojeda changed command in June 1951 and the 10th BCT redeployed from Korea soon after him in September 1951 and were replaced by another Filipino PEFTOK unit.  The Philippine government maintained their PEFTOK troop commitment to Korea until May 1955, two years after the Demilitarized Zone was established with the signing of the armistice agreement. Overall 7,420 Filipino soldiers fought in the Korean War making the Philippines the fourth largest contributor of combat troops to aid in the defense of Korea. 112 soldiers died and approximately over 400 were wounded during the PEFTOK participation in the Korean War. The “Fighting Filipinos” would receive many combat decorations during the Korean War to include Lt. Artiaga posthumously receiving the US Distinguished Service Cross for his actions during the Battle of the Yultong. The Tank Company received a 8th Army unit citation for their actions at the Battle of the Yultong as well. The PEFTOK units were also awarded the Presidential Unit Citations from South Korean President Syngman Rhee.

To this day the Korean government honors the veterans of the Philippines who fought in the Korean War with a memorial located near the location of the Battle of the Yultong:

Additionally the PEFTOK soldiers are memorialized in the Korean War memorial in Seoul where reunions for Filipino veterans are held and have even been attended by prior Korean presidents.  Without a doubt the person that brought out the best of the first PEFTOK battalion sent to fight in the Korean War and set the standard for all follow on PEFTOK units was Lieutenant Colonel Dionisio Ojeda. Because of his leadership and combat ability LTC Ojeda is truly a hero of the Korean War.

Note: You can read more of the ROK Drop featured series Heroes of the Korean War at the below link: