Tag: Paul Freeman

It is good to see that General Paul Freeman’s name is being maintained on the new 2ID division headquarters building at Camp Humphreys:

The 2nd Infantry Division dedicated its new headquarters building on Camp Humphreys Tuesday, officially opening a new chapter after moving from its decades-old home north of Seoul.

The ceremony took place at the entrance of the new Freeman Hall, which retains the name of the previous headquarters on Camp Red Cloud in Uijeongbu.

The Indianhead Division has been stationed near the front lines with North Korea since the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended in an armistice instead of a peace treaty.  [Stars & Stripes]

You can read more at the link, but if you are interested in learning more about one of my Heroes of the Korean War, Paul Freeman I recommend checking out the below link:

https://www.rokdrop.net/2007/02/heroes-of-the-korean-war-colonel-paul-freeman/

February 15, 1951, Day Break of Victory

The reserve Ranger company and some soldiers from B Company had arrived at day break to relieve the artillerymen holding the front line. Soon after the sound of friendly aircraft could be heard in the air. Throughout the day friendly aircraft pounded the Chinese held ridge line with everything they had while the American infantry men supported by tank and artillery fire fought to take back the hill. Just through sheer man power the Chinese continued to stubbornly hold on to the hill. In fact the reserve force was thrown back off the hill three times by the Chinese throughout the course of the day. Eventually COL Freeman made the call to have his lone tank platoon to drive down the road outside of friendly lines and shoot at the back side of the Chinese held ridge line. While the tanks fired on the flanks of the enemy the reserve force would conduct a frontal assault right up the hill in one last attempt to capture it.

While this battled raged on a relief column was being organized to relieve the besieged 23rd Infantry. Colonel Marcel Crombez the commander of the 5th Cavalry Regiment led a column of 23 tanks, 160 infantry men, and 4 engineers from his unit up the 6 mile road leading to Chipyong-ni. They had no trucks so the infantrymen sat on top of the tanks as they rolled north to Chipyong-ni. The relief column started up the road at 3:45PM on February 15, 1951. During the journey up the road the Chinese attacked the column twice. The Chinese charged the tanks with human waves equipped with explosives to blow up the tanks with. The fighting was absolutely ferocious and casualties were heavy on both sides. By the time Crombez’s tanks reached Chipyong-ni only 23 of the 164 infantrymen and engineers riding on the tanks were alive. Of those 23, 13 were walking wounded, only 10 arrived in Chipyong-ni unscathed.

The view from McGee Hill looking south towards the road that COL Crombez’s relief column would appeared from and begin pouring fire on Mangmisan located towards the left of this picture.

This is what the view from the same hill looked like during the battle in 1951

Meanwhile the attack on McGee Hill continued for the 23rd Infantry. The platoon of four 23IN tanks began to hit the flanks of McGee Hill with tank fire. The Chinese tried to assault the tanks with no success. The fire from the tanks combined with the reserve force charging up the front of McGee Hill was enough to cause the Chinese defenders to begin to crack. As the Chinese began to fall back off of McGee Hill towards their stronghold on Mangmisan Mountain, COL Crombez’s relief column appeared over the horizon and began to pour a tremendous amount of tank fire on their mountain stronghold. The Chinese on Mangmisan were now in full retreat with the arrival of Crombez’s tanks. The retreat of this Chinese unit and the arrival of the additional US tanks was enough to cause the remaining Chinese forces to fall into a mass panic and retreat from Chipyong-ni. It was the reverse of the “bug out” fever that had effected US troops when the war first began and now for the first time during the war, the Chinese were the ones “bugging out”.

By night fall all the Chinese had pulled out of the Chipyong-ni area completely; the allied forces had their first victory over the Chinese Communist Forces in the Korean War. The US 23rd Infantry Regiment and their attached French Battalion consisted of only 4,500 soldiers and yet they had some how defeated a vastly larger force of over 25,000 Chinese. The battle did takes it’s toll on the 23rd Infantry Regiment. 52 men from the regiment died, 259 were wounded, and 42 men were missing in action after the battle. The battle was far more costly for the Chinese. Allied forces over the next few days would count over 5,000 Chinese corpses in the surrounding rice paddies, hills, and valleys around Chipyong-ni. Most importantly for the allies this victory showed the rest of the allied forces that the Chinese despite superior numbers could be defeated when confronted with determined men led by great leaders like Colonel Paul Freeman.

The village of Chipyong-ni as seen today.

Prior Posting: A Bloody Valentine’s Day

Note: You can read more of the ROK Drop featured series Heroes of the Korean War at the below link:

February 14, 1951, A Bloody Valentine’s Day

On Valentine’s Day of 1951, Air Force spotter planes flew over the surrounding high hills of Chipyong-ni trying to detect the Chinese positions and attack them with rockets and napalm. As usual the Chinese were masters at hiding during the day from allied air attack and little attrition of the Chinese forces was caused by the Air Force planes. Despite the air cover the Chinese mortar men were still able to launch an occasional mortar towards the 23INF’s positions. One of these mortars landed in the vicinity of the regimental command post killing one staff officer and wounding COL Freeman in the leg. Lieutenant General Almond the X Corps commander ordered COL Freeman to leave Chipyong-ni to have his wound treated and sent his operations officer COL Chiles to relieve Freeman. Freeman refused this order because he knew the battle had not been won yet and would not abandon his men.

The Air Force planes that buzzed overhead did allow the 23INF’s forces to take a breather from heavy Chinese attack and the allied soldiers used this time to continuing to fortify their positions and restock their ammunition. COL Freeman limping on one good leg walked around the frontlines and inspected the positions and encourage his soldiers. While he was doing this air drops of resupplies were also being parachuted into Chipyong-ni. However some key ammunition such as mortar rounds were not air dropped. Also the rifle ammunition that was air dropped was individual rounds that were not clipped, which meant somebody would have to clip all those thousands of rounds of ammunition.

Something extraordinary that happened that day was that General Ridgeway helicoptered into Chipyong-ni to encourage the soldiers and review defensive plans with COL Freeman:

The fact that the commanding 8th Army general risked flying into a city besieged by four Chinese division should have been enough of an indicator to the 23INF’s soldiers how important the Battle of Chipyong-ni had become. The highlight of the day however for the soldiers would not be General Ridgeway’s visit, but that the soldiers of the 23INF would have a chance to eat hot chow that day. Nothing motivates a soldier more than their stomachs. For many it would be the last meal they would ever eat.

23IN Soldiers take a break during the day of 13FEB51, Left: William C. Scott, he would die the next night in hand to hand combat, Center: Charles Buttimo, wounded for the 5th time during the battle and sent home, Right: William Johnson, one of the few soldiers to survive the battle without a scratch; was later taken prisoner by the Chinese in May, 1951.

It was so peaceful that day, that rumors began to spread that the Chinese had withdrawn. However, all these rumor were dispelled once night fell over Chipyong-ni on February 14. It was Valentine’s Day, but the Chinese had no intention of showing any love for the 23INF’s forces. The Chinese attack began with signal flares shooting across the sky and bugles sounding off in the distance followed by a ferocious artillery barrage. Once the artillery barrage ended the Chinese began their assault on sides of the 23INF’s defensive perimeter. G Company like the night before was pounded with waves of Chinese attackers that surged down the spur of land that ran from Mangmisan mountain. Other Chinese attacks were occurring simultaneously around the entire regimental perimeter, but clearly the spur of land running from Mangmisan mountain had been chosen as the avenue of approach for the Chinese main effort of this battle. The effectiveness of the prior nights probing attacks had been successful enough for the Chinese generals to believe that an overwhelming commitment of troops to charge the G Company lines would be enough to penetrate the 23INF’s defenses.

To the left you can see the hill held by G Company and Mangmisan mountain in the background.

1LT Heath received word from his third platoon leader, LT McGee, that his platoon located on what would become known as McGee Hill, was receiving heavy casualties from the Chinese assault and could not hold out much longer. 1LT Heath ran down the hill to the nearby artillery position to ask the B/503FA battery commander to provide him some soldiers to help shore up his frontlines. The field artillery commander gave 1LT Heath 15 men to help plug the hole in his line. As he led them up the hill the Chinese were on top of the hill firing down on them. The field artillerymen ran away. 1LT Heath charged after the artillerymen and reformed them and commanded that they charge the hill and fight. It is during this time that 1LT Heath uttered these famous words from the battle:

Goddamit, get back up on that hill! You’ll die down here anyway, you might as well go up on the hill and die there!

It was now about 0100 at night and the artillerymen continued to hide and refused to fight. This was clearly not the finest hour for US artillerymen during the Korean War. However, help did eventually come, Captain Elledge an artillery liaison officer overhead 1LT Heath’s yelling. CPT Elledge was one of those guys that liked a good fight and ran to the sounds of the guns. Elledge rounded up ten artillerymen and charged up McGee Hill in order to plug the hole in G Company lines. Elledge and his men climbed the hill on it’s left flank and found dead soldiers in the fox hills, but oddly enough no Chinese. He had the bodies removed from the holes and he emplaced his artillerymen in them. Elledge even ran back down the hill to carry up a .50 cal machine gun for the artillerymen to defend the position with. Despite CPT Elledge’s actions G Company continued to crumble on the hill.

COL Freeman was well aware of the breach of the regiment’s line in the G Company sector but was hesitant to commit his regimental reserve which consisted of one Ranger company to shore up the line because of a severe enemy thrust in the 3rd Battalion lines. He compromised and sent one Ranger platoon and a tank from his reserve to help 1LT Heath. It was about 0300 and the Chinese infantry were now firing down the hill into the artillery positions located at the bottom of the hill.

Picture of Chipyong-ni from Hal Barker’s collection

The 2nd Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Edwards had assigned a platoon from F Company along with a few artillerymen and the few remaining men from G company to form a counterattack force to retake the hill. The total counterattack force was composed of 36 men from the Ranger platoon, 28 men from F Company, 7 artillerymen, 2 machine gunners, and the 5 men left from G Company. LT Curtis was the platoon leader from the F Company platoon and LTC Edwards assigned him to lead the counterattack, however the Ranger Company commander had accompanied his platoon to the G Company lines and refused to allow his platoon to be commanded by LT Curtis. Rangers back then had big ego just like they do now and he didn’t want a regular infantry officer commanding his Ranger platoon and thus said that only COL Freeman could order his platoon into battle. LTC Edwards solved the command problem by sending one of his staff officers Captain John Ramsburg to command the counterattack force who outranked everyone from the Ranger Company. With the command situation resolved CPT Ramsburg began to organize his force. As he organized his force he called in a mortar strike in order to prep the hill for the counterattack. The mortar strike lasted only 2-3 minutes before the mortar men ran out of ammunition. Remember that mortar rounds were not included in the ammunition resupply air drop that day.

In response to the mortar attack the Chinese began firing mortars back at the counterattack force at the bottom of the hill. The Ranger company commander began issuing orders to his men that interfered with the orders that CPT Ramsburg was giving. Ramsburg ordered the Ranger commander to evacuate his wounded from the mortar strike. As the Ranger commander evacuated his wounded, Ramsburg used this opportunity to launch his counterattack at about 0345. The Ranger platoon lead the way up the hill followed by F company and the other soldiers of the counterattacking force. The Rangers yelled as they charged up the hill, but it drew the attention of French machine gunners on a nearby hill that mistook the Rangers as Chinese. Two French machine guns opened up on the hill. LT Curtis who Ramsburg had sent to warn the nearby tank about the counterattack saw the French machine guns firing at the hill and figured the Chinese had mounted an attack down the hill and ordered the American tank to fire at the hill as well. The counterattack force was being pummeled by both Chinese, American, and French fire.

Ramsburg ran towards Curtis and told him to stop the tank firing. 1LT Curtis stopped the tank from firing and then proceeded to get the French machine gunners to stop firing as well. Despite all of this some of the Ranger platoon were able to reach the top of the hill and shouted for more men to climb the hill to join them. CPT Ramsburg began leading more men up McGee Hill when he was wounded by a grenade breaking his ankle. 1LT Heath who saw Ramsburg go down offered to lead the attack up the hill for him. Ramsburg agreed and Heath continued the attack back up the hill. Ramsburg then slowly began limping his way up the hill when he saw soldiers dragging a body back down the hill; it was 1LT Heath, he had been shot through the chest. Heath had been shot through the chest and the Ranger Platoon leader was killed when they crested the hill by Chinese fire. Heath was seriously wounded, but would survive the battle. As Ramsburg continued to limp up the hill more bodies began rolling down the hill. Finally a small group of soldiers ran down the hill towards Ramsburg and told him the Chinese had counterattacked and recaptured the hill, there was nobody left. The counterattack ended.

Ramsburg went down the hill and consolidated the handful of men left from the counterattack force, the walking wounded, and the artillerymen at the bottom of the hill to form a final defensive line to shoot any Chinese coming down the hill. As Ramsburg formed the defensive line, LT Curtis in the darkness quietly snuck up the hill multiple times to pull down more wounded US soldiers. The battalion commander LTC Edwards on the other hand was able to persuade COL Freeman to commit the rest of the Ranger Company to the fight in his battalion’s sector. Ramsburg’s hodgepodge of men just needed to hold on long enough until the rest of the Ranger Company arrived. However, Ramsburg’s hodgepodge could not hold the Chinese very long because every single man he had left was wounded. CPT Ramsburg gave the order to fall back to lower hill behind the artillery positions and to evacuate the seriously wounded back to Chipyong-ni. The infantrymen were falling back because there was simply none of them combat capable anymore and the artillerymen who had fled the fight on the hill were now the last hope to hold the line against the Chinese attack.

Quad .50 cal machine gun

While all of this was going on the artillery liaison officer, CPT Elledge and his small group of men, who had been also driven off the ridge by the Chinese, were working hard trying to recover a tracked quad .50 cal that had sunk in a rice paddy near the artillery positions. He had just gotten it pulled out of the rice paddy by using the lone tank that had come with the Ranger platoon. Elledge had just gotten the quad .50 cal powered up when he saw CPT Ramsburg’s men falling back. Elledge yelled at Ramsburg if any Americans were left on the hill. Ramsburg told there wasn’t any left and to fire away. The bullets from the four .50 cals on the track smashed into the hills claiming many Chinese lives. American soldiers would later describe the quad .50 cals at hitting the hill almost like a vacuum cleaner. Like I said, Elledge liked a good fight. By this time the first rays of light from the coming morning were visible which allowed the tank commander Master Sergeant Andrew Reyna to spot sixteen wounded men from the counterattack force lying at the bottom of the hill; pinned down by the Chinese fire. As Elledge continued to vacuum the hill with his quad .50 cal, MSG Reyna and his crew drove their tank towards the base of the hill and threw the wounded on the tank and drove off to evacuate them.

By this time three more American tanks had pulled up to help CPT Elledge hold the defensive line. The tanks poured more fire into the ridge line, while Elledge ordered the artillerymen to point their 155mm howitzers at the ridge line and fire. The sounds of the howitzers firing and the rounds instantly smashing into the ridge line had to be absolutely thunderous. By this time the sun was clearly up and the US soldiers felt some sense of relief because the Chinese soldiers usually withdrew at the first sign of day light because of they feared strafing by the US planes. However, this morning the Chinese decided to stay and fight. It would be a fateful mistake.

Next Posting: Day Break of Victory

Prior Posting: Preparing for Battle 

After reading about the heroism of these men, I have never thought of Valentine’s Day in the same way.

James Dietz Print of the Battle of Chipyong-ni

Preparing for Battle

COL Freeman’s 23INF Regiment after winning the fight at Twin Tunnels followed by the securing of the village of Chipyong-ni stood at about 70% combat power when he was given the order to hold Chipyong-ni from about 5 Chinese divisions located in the surrounding hillsides. COL Freeman’s combat power consisted of three battalion’s of infantry and augmented with B Battery 503 Field Artillery which was equipped with 155mm guns, plus B Battery 37th Field Artillery regiment which was actually an Air Defense Artillery unit equipped with tracked gun systems, an Engineer company, a Ranger Company, and a medical company. What made the 23INF Regiment so different from the other US infantry regiments in Korea was the fact they were also augmented with a 1,000 man all volunteer battalion from the French military led by one of my all time favorite military leaders, LTC Ralph Monclar. COL Freeman’s regiment totaled 4,500 soldiers with only 2,500 of the soldiers being dedicated infantrymen to face approximately 20,000 Chinese troops in the surrounding hillsides.

COL Freeman knew that his limited man power meant that he could not hold positions on the high hillsides that surrounded Chipyong-ni because it would spread his regiment out too thin. So instead he consolidated his frontlines on smaller hills near the village that overlooked the surrounding rice paddies. COL Freeman put his engineers to work improving the fighting positions around the village and stocking up on supplies needed for the expected Chinese siege of the village. A siege is what COL Freeman got from the Chinese. The week before the pivotal battle beginning on February 13, 1951, the Chinese consolidated positions around the 23INF and cut off all supply lines to the city. The Chinese commanders were intent on destroying the hated 23INF who had inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese during the retreat from Kunu-ri in North Korea and the battle of Twin Tunnels just two weeks prior.

This map gives a pretty good generic look at what the frontlines at Chipyong-ni looked like during the battle:

Colonel Freeman positioned his units in a circular defense with one battalion covering each possible Chinese direction of approach to the village. As the 23INF soldiers worked hard to construct their defensive lines the Chinese could be seen moving on the hillsides and preparing for the expected assault on Chipyong-ni. On the night of February 13th bugles could be heard and glow in the dark numbers taped to the backs of Chinese spotters could be seen by the 23INF’s soldiers that were being used to move Chinese forces into position for that nights assault on the 23INF’s frontlines.

These low hills seen today are where the French battalion’s positions were located.

February 13, 1951, The Chinese Attack Begins

The first attacks were launched against the 2nd Battalion in the south and the French battalion in the west. The attack was not a massive human wave assault as the allied soldiers had been accustomed to seeing from the Chinese which indicated this was a probing attack to identify the 23INF foxhole locations and the positioning of their heavy machine guns before the final Chinese assault. Recognizing this the French forces launched their own assault back at the Chinese by fixing bayonets and charging directly at the Chinese forces advancing across the rice paddies to the front of the French battalion’s frontlines. The French assault came complete with the playing of an air raid siren to mock the use of the Chinese bugles being played to direct the Chinese troops. The French soldiers, many of them Algerians with red turbans were outnumbered four to one by the Chinese, but they so intimidated the Chinese that many of them ran back towards the Chinese frontlines and a few even surrendered to the French.

Here is a view from the French frontlines looking towards the two Chinese controlled hills. Notice the flat rice paddies the Chinese had to cross in order to engage the French soldiers. It really isn’t surprising that the Chinese decided not to use this axis of advance as the main effort of their attack.

The 2nd Battalion’s G & F Company as well deterred the Chinese probing attacks that night, but with some difficulty. The two companies were positioned along a ridge line that included a spur of land that shot up the side of the large 397 meter Mangmisan mountain. Unlike the French who had the advantage due to the Chinese having to cross a large rice paddy, the US soldiers had to fight four different assaults on their position that night by Chinese forces primarily using this spur of land from Mangmisan mountain. 1LT Thomas Heath the G Company Commander, had a fougasse bomb, which is a barrelled napalm mixture, installed at the bottom of his hill. As the Chinese charged his hill 1LT Heath initiated the defense by blasting the napalm bomb that incinerated the charging Chinese. However, more Chinese continued to pour down the mountain directly towards the G Company lines, but the defenders continued to hold off the Chinese assaults.

This soldier died during the Chinese night assault that captured the saddle he was on.  Photo by Otto Schmaltz.

Chinese continued to probe the entire regiment’s defensive lines the rest of the night, but the next morning all the Chinese withdrew just after first light and COL Freeman sent out recon teams around the perimeter to look for any remaining Chinese soldiers and determine the number of dead. The patrols killed and captured a few Chinese soldiers that had been left behind from the night time assault. The patrol had counted approximately 500 dead Chinese bodies around the regimental lines with an unknown number of dead and wounded from artillery strikes in the surrounding hill sides. A light snow started to fall the morning of February 14, which eerily covered the dead Chinese soldiers; it was Valentine’s Day.

Next Posting: A Bloody Valentine’s Day

Prior Posting: Making a Stand 

Making a Stand

In the winter of 1951 the American commanded United Nations’ forces in Korea found themselves in a continuous full scale retreat from the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) that had entered the Korean War in November 1950. Prior to the Chinese intervention into the war, the American commanders and troops expected the war to be over by Christmas 1950 after General Douglas MacArthur’s successful Inchon Landing Operation in September 1950 ultimately crushed the North Korean army and moved the war into the communist north to conduct mop up operations of the remainder of the North Korean military. However, the UN advance into North Korea would be short lived as 600,000 Chinese “volunteers” charged down the North Korean hillsides, inflicting heavy casualties, and putting the UN forces into full scale retreat. Once a retreat is started it is hard to stop especially when many of the soldiers retreating are draftees fighting in a “police action” they hardly understood and had been told just weeks prior that they would be home for Christmas.

It was going to take great leadership in order to stop the retreat and regain the fighting spirit of the United States military. The first sign of great leadership would come from newly installed Eighth United States Army commander General Matthew Ridgeway. Ridgeway was installed as the 8th Army commander after the death of former 8th Army commander General Walton Walker in a jeep accident in December 1950. Ridgeway served as a paratrooper during World War II; most notably as the division commander of the 82nd Airborne Division to include jumping into Normandy with his division during the D-Day Landings in 1944. Before coming to Korea Ridgeway was the commander of the Panama Canal Zone and was thus far removed from the happenings of Korea. Once in theatre Ridgeway quickly discovered how demoralized the American forces were and aggressively began to implement a no retreat policy. He in fact relieved his G3 operations officer when he drew up retreat contingency plans for the general to review. However, it is one thing to say no more retreat and quite another to get soldiers to implement and most importantly believe in this policy. The job to both implement and get soldiers to believe in this policy would fall to a man named Colonel Paul Freeman, at a place called Chipyong-ni.

COL Freeman was the commander of the 23rd US Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division (Yes the same 2ID of taxi cab related incident fame). The regiment had just come off a minor victory over Chinese troops at a place called Twin Tunnels three miles south of the village of Chipyong-ni. After the battle COL Freeman moved the regiment to the village that was located in a flat valley of rice paddies surrounded on all sides by steep hillsides. The regiment’s success at Twin Tunnels followed by their advance to Chipyong-ni had left the regiment ultimately at a tactical disadvantage because the friendly units to their east and west had retreated from the prior Chinese assault, leaving COL Freeman’s flanks exposed to Chinese attack. Once COL Freeman realized his tactical situation he radioed to the 2ID commander that he wanted to withdraw 15 south to secure his flanks with the remainder of the US forces. The 2ID commander approved his request along with the Corps commander, but once the request for COL Freeman’s withdrawal reached General Ridgeway he simply said said something to the equivalent of “F–k No!”

The village of Chipyong-ni was of strategic value to Ridgeway due to the fact it was a key road intersection for all vehicular movement in the area. If any future American offensive operation was to be launched Ridgeway needed to hold on to Chipyong-ni. Most importantly Ridgeway needed to set a tone. The 23rd INF’s earlier success at Twin Tunnels showed that the unit had fighting spirit and good leadership. Ridgeway needed someone to make a stand against the Chinese and show the rest of the US and UN forces that the Chinese were not the unbeatable adversary that most of the demoralized troops thought they were. He was counting on COL Freeman and the men of the 23rd INF to be ones to make that stand.

Next Posting: Preparing for Battle