Here is what the USFK commander General Brooks had to say about North Korea’s recent overtures:
Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), speaks in a lecture at Seoul Cyber University on Jan. 4, 2018. (Yonhap)
The commanding general of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) on Thursday stressed the importance of combat readiness and unity among regional powers to cope with North Korea’s recent peace offensive.
“We can be generally pleased by the recent overtures that happened. But we must keep our expectations at the appropriate level,” Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, who leads the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), said at a lecture in Seoul.
He was referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s Day statement that his country is willing to join the Winter Olympics that will open in the South Korean town of PyeongChang next month. He proposed immediate inter-Korean dialogue to discuss the issue.
In a follow-up move, the two Koreas reconnected a cross-border communication channel Wednesday, two years after it was severed, and are preparing to hold high-level talks.
It represents Pyongyang’s “sincere” pursuit of reconciliation, but it may be in line with its typical strategy to keep apart five countries — South Korea, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia — aimed at weakening their power against the regime trying to win the status of a “nuclear capable” nation.
“We can’t ignore that reality,” the command emphasized during the session at Seoul Cyber University, organized by the National Unification Advisory Council, a presidential consultative body mainly on long-term inter-Korean ties.
In the face of the North’s peace gesture, he said, it’s important for South Korea and the U.S. to maintain an “ironclad and razor sharp” alliance and joint combat readiness in the event that it leads to a “negative outcome, not a positive outcome.”
He likened North Korea to the center of a palm and the five regional powers to five fingers, showing his right hand.
The North wants these five fingers to be separated but they should operate in “harmony and closely connected to one another” as a fist to create necessary pressure to cause a change in its course, he added. [Yonhap]
You can read more at the link, but I think the problem with General Brooks analogy is that two of the fingers have no intention of being part of the fist, Russia and China. It is arguable they share the same strategic objective of the Kim regime to separate the US from the ROK.
Every year there are overtures to the South that are perceived as harbingers of changed regime behavior. But we are still waiting for Godot. https://t.co/jfWLWdWE3I
It looks like the US media may be misinterpreting whatever information was leaked to them about an impending North Korea ICBM test:
South Korea’s defense authorities said Thursday there has been no indication of an imminent missile test by North Korea, responding to U.S. news reports that the secretive nation appears to be preparing to fire another intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
“There is no activity that would lead to an assessment that a missile provocation by North Korea is imminent,” Army Col. Roh Jae-cheon, spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a press briefing.
He pointed out, however, that it’s possible for the North to press ahead with a missile provocation anytime, adding South Korea and the United States are closely monitoring related situations.
Earlier this week, CBS News reported that the North has resumed its missile activity at the same site it shot an ICBM in November.
Newsweek also quoted U.S. officials as saying a new missile test may come as soon as later this week or next week. [Yonhap]
Via a reader tip comes an interesting article in The Diplomat that discusses how a failed North Korean missile test in April 2017 came crashing down on a North Korean city:
Images from ICBM celebration concert showing the Hwasong-12 launch from Pukchang Airfield.
What happens when a North Korean ballistic missile test fails in flight and explodes in a populated area? On April 28, 2017, North Korea launched a single Hwasong-12/KN17 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) from Pukchang Airfield in South Pyongan Province (the Korean People’s Army’s Air and Anti-Air Force Unit 447 in Ryongak-dong, Sunchon City, to be more precise). That missile failed shortly after launch and crashed in the Chongsin-dong, in North Korean city of Tokchon, causing considerable damage to a complex of industrial or agricultural buildings.
According to a U.S. government source with knowledge of North Korea’s weapons programs who spoke to The Diplomat, the missile’s first stage engines failed after approximately one minute of powered flight, resulting in catastrophic failure. The missile never flew higher than approximately 70 kilometers. The location of the missile’s eventual impact was revealed exclusively to The Diplomat and evidence of the incident can be independently corroborated in commercially available satellite imagery from April and May 2017.
The April 28 failure merits close analysis, especially as North Korea continues to carry out flight-testing of its various ballistic missile platforms from a range of new test sites. In 2017, North Korea has introduced new sites for missile testing, arguably to demonstrate the flexibility of its Strategic Rocket Force. It has even carried out ballistic missile launches from a restricted area at Pyongyang’s Sunan Airport, which also serves as the country’s primary civil aviation facility and the entrypoint for most non-Chinese foreign visitors to North Korea. The potential for similar accidents occurring over Pyongyang, the country’s capital, or other populated regions remains high, especially with untested systems.
These risks may even serve to explain why North Korea chose to use the seaside town of Sinpo as its initial test site for the first two failed Hwasong-12 launches in April. An early in-flight failure over the sea would have a lower chance of striking any human infrastructure — certainly populated urban areas. However, since April, North Korea has not carried out any further ballistic missile testing from Sinpo (with the exception of four submarine-launched ballistic missile ejection tests). [The Diplomat]
I recommend reading the whole thing at the link to include viewing the interesting satellite imagery.
Below is a fascinating read in the Nikkei Asian Review about how the Kim regime has long claimed that Northeastern China should be ceded to North Korea:
Sino-North Korean relations have traversed three eras in China — under Mao, Deng and Xi — and a North Korean dynasty of three Kims — Il Sung, Jong Il and Jong Un.
Back in May 2000, Kim Jong Il made his first trip to China as North Korea’s top leader. An informal visit, it was kept under wraps until Kim, the father of North Korea’s current leader, returned to Pyongyang.
Kim had a big request for Jiang Zemin, then China’s president.
“I am preparing for an inspection of the northeast region [of China],” Kim told Jiang. “Could you make arrangements for it?”
Jiang’s face contorted into a quizzical expression. The word Kim used was the Korean equivalent of shicha, a Chinese term meaning inspection. Inspections are what leaders conduct to see how their own common people are doing.
Kim’s use of inspection not only contradicted reality, it was disrespectful to China.
Jiang told Kim in a calm manner, “In your case, you mean visit, correct?”
“No,” Kim snapped back immediately. “It is an inspection. My father [Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s first leader] told me that the entire ‘northeast’ belongs to us.”
Stunned by Kim’s response, Jiang asked the North Korean leader, “How can the ‘northeast’ be all yours?”
“This is not my father’s view,” Kim said. “This is a remark made by Chairman Mao Zedong,” the founding father of the People’s Republic of China.
Again, Jiang was flabbergasted. This time, he summoned an official from the Communist Party’s International Liaison Department and ordered him to check whether Mao had actually made such a remark in the past.
The official reported back to Jiang the following afternoon, confirming Mao’s remarks. [Nikkei Asian Review]
You can read the rest at the link, but Mao made a comment to Kim Il-sung how prior Korean dynasties had been pushed out of Northeast China to south of the Yalu River by past Chinese emperors. Kim Il-sung used that comment to justify North Korea being ceded a chunk of Northeast China which Chinese leaders over the years have scoffed at to include when Kim Jong-il brought it up. It is unclear if the current North Korean leader Kim Jong-un shares such delusions of grandeur, but considering that his grandfather and father believed in it, I would not be surprised if Kim Jong-un doesn’t bring up the issue again at some point with China as well.
The speculation is the Kim Jong-un will send a high ranking political official along with sports officials to the Winter Olympics:
In Dec. 30 footage on North Korea’s state-run Korean Central Television of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s attendance of a celebratory performance at the 5th Conference of Party Cell Chairs, Kim is shown climbing the steps of the performance venue while talking to his younger sister Kim Yo-jong, vice director of the Korean Workers’ Party. (Pyongyang/KCNA, Yonhap News)
A North Korean delegation to the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics could be led by Kim Yo-jong or by Choe Ryong-hae, the second-most powerful person in the North.
During his personally delivered New Year’s address, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un expressed his hope that the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics would be a success and declared his willingness to take the necessary measures, such as sending a delegation to South Korea. The delegation that Kim mentioned would presumably include International Olympic Committee member Jang Ung, National Sports Guidance Committee chairman (NSGC) Choe Hwi and Minister of Sports Kim Il-guk. [Hankyoreh]
You can read more at the link, but if he sends his sister to South Korea I think that is a sign that Kim Jong-un is really pushing his charm offensive on South Korea to get concessions after an extended period of provocations. Having his sister attend the games would give North Korea a softer touch internationally with all the cameras on her instead of the sternly faced old men that usually attend these events.
The Moon administration seems giddy after Kim Jong-un’s New Year message offering to send a delegation to the Winter Olympics:
This photo, taken on Jan. 2, 2017, shows Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon proposing high-level talks with North Korea next week. (Yonhap)
Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon proposed Tuesday holding high-level talks with North Korea, Jan. 9, to discuss its participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics.
Cho’s offer came in response to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s message, in which he said he was willing to send a delegation of athletes to the South’s first Winter Olympics.
Minister Cho suggested holding the cross-border dialogue at the truce village of Panmunjeom. He said Seoul is open to discuss the timing, venues, methods and other preparatory steps regarding the talks with Pyongyang.
“We propose to hold high-level talks on Jan. 9 at the Peace House (on the South Korean side of Panmunjeom),” Cho said during a press conference at the ministry in downtown Seoul. “We’re willing to talk with the North freely over the necessary steps both sides must take. To do so, the dialogue channel at Panmunjeom should be restored promptly. We expect to hear a positive response from the North soon.”
If North Korea accepts, this will be the first cross-border dialogue since President Moon Jae-in took office in May 2017. It will also be the highest-level contact between the two Koreas since December 2015 when vice minister-level officials met. [Korea Times]
You can read more at the link, but for long time Korea watchers like myself this is just another example of the pattern with North Korea of raising tensions with provocations and then conducting a charm offensive to get concessions. Once they get the concessions they will then break whatever agreement they made and blame the US and the ROK and restart the provocation cycle.
What is different this time is President Trump seems determined to enforce stricter sanctions and President Moon seems determined to start another Sunshine Policy particularly trying to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex. I can easily see a return to the failed Sunshine Policy causing tension politically between the US and the ROK which is likely one of the goals of the Kim regime if they do implement a charm offensive.
