Once again doing my part to help the Korean government:

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I have been out of the loop for the last ten days due to my increasingly busy day job. When blogging about Korea missing ten days causes one to fall way behind on events because as those who follow Korea know, a lot of crap can happen in ten days in Korea, and the past ten days has been no different.First of all Robert Neff has an interesting article in the Korea Herald which was cross posted on the Marmot’s Hole about the disinterment of foreign graves in Seoul:

The Latin expression ?requiescat in pace? or ?rest in peace? is a prayer for the repose of the dead, but for many of those buried at the Foreigners? Cemetery in Mapo-gu, their continued peaceful rest is uncertain.

There is mounting concern among members of the foreign community about the future sanctity and security of certain graves at the Yangwhajin Foreigners? Cemetery. Those not classified as missionaries face the possibility of being disinterred, or possibly even worse, having the grave markers removed and the ground put to other use.

At the center of the controversy is the 100th Anniversary Church (HAC), which claims to be the caretaker of the almost 550 graves containing the remains of missionaries, diplomats, soldiers, businesspeople and expats from 16 nations.

This is pretty sickening but really not surprising when one considers the rate of development in Seoul that proceeds at all costs, even it means building over the bodies of some foreigners. There are more than 67 American soldiers, State Department and contractors and their families buried in this cemetery and one of the mentioned targets of possible removal were American soldiers and their families. Hopefully the attention brought to the issue by Mr. Neff will cause the US Embassy to get involved in this issue.

Another recent issue was the latest US soldier shenanigans in Uijongbu. The video of the incident doesn’t look good, but there wasn’t much context in the video of what happened. Since this will most likely go to a Korean court the soldiers will be found guilty no matter what the circumstances are because in Korea GI’s are guilty until proven guilty. Anyway, the soldiers involved will not have much money to buy anymore alcohol once they have to make their “blood money” payments to the bus driver and passengers. It will be most interesting to see if the soldiers receive jail time for this incident. From personal experience I do have to say from riding the buses in Uijongbu quite frequently that I have never had any problems with the bus drivers and found them quite nice unlike their taxi cab counterparts in Uijongbu. So I tend to think that bus driver did no do anything to instigate an incident, which the Uijongbu taxi cab drivers are well known for. As a general rule that I advise GI’s in Korea with, is that being drunk and public transportation don’t go together. These guys are about to find that out the hard way.

Nomad has linked to a Stars and Stripes article where the bus company manager didn’t seem to troubled by the incident after receiving a USFK compensation payment for the damages:

The manager said he couldn?t understand why the case had garnered so much media attention. ?Drunk Korean male passengers are generally making a far bigger commotion and violence on the bus, twice a month on average,? he said. ?The last time I saw U.S. soldiers disrupting this bus company was two years ago. ? It is a very rare case for the U.S. soldiers to be involved in this turmoil.? The soldiers were singing loudly when they boarded the bus, before they began breaking the door, the manager said. No one was hurt and the soldiers have formally apologized to the company, the manager said.

I wonder if that quote ever got printed in a Korean language newspaper?

Then in further news Dokdo II is happening this time with China, Kim Dae-jung is officially unhinged, while another Uri Party lawmaker shows his true colors. Then who can blame the world’s worst kidnappers for kidnapping her, the Camp Humphreys expansion is actually beginning with no violence so far, and more prostitution “crackdowns” from Korea’s keystone cops. Same old, same old news from Korea.

A little known hike that may be of interest to some is up Godaesan Mountain in northern Gyeongi-do province.  The views from the summit of this mountain provides a bird’s eye view of the entire Chorwon Valley.  This valley during the Korean War was known as the “Iron Triangle“.  By hiking up Godaesan mountain you can get a great view of the Iron Triangle yourself not to mention a look into North Korea if it is clear out.

Click Here to read the complete entry and see photo album.

The Fall of Taejon 

It was July 17th, 1950, with orders from Lieutenant General Walton Walker to continue to hold the South Korean city of Taejon in order to delay the advancing North Koreans the US24ID commander Major General William Dean found himself with a broken division, which was heavily decimated by the preceding two weeks of fighting. The division was at less than 50% strength, morale extremely low, the division had no communications, few vehicles, little equipment, short on food, running low on ammunition, and completely surrounded by 20,000 pissed off North Koreans. So MG Dean did what any good general would do in these circumstances, he grabbed a bazooka.

For the next three days MG Dean and what few men he had left in his immediate area conducted an urban guerrilla campaign against the North Koreans in Taejon. One of the things LTG Walker had brought with him along with the bad news that the US24ID had to hold on in Taejon, was a supply of a new anti-armor weapon, the 3.5in bazooka that was billed as being able to penetrate the armor of the North Korean T-34 tanks that had so devastated the US combat formations. Using hit and run tactics MG Dean and his tank killer teams actually enjoyed some success in knocking out the T-34 tanks in Taejon including MG Dean’s team personally knocking out one tank.

North Korean T-34 Destroyed by One of MG Dean’s Tank Killer Teams in Taejon.

Some have criticized MG Dean for essentially turning himself into just another infantryman and losing command and control of his combat formations. The problem was he had no formations left to command and control. The soldiers left in the division had essentially turned into individual teams fighting their own war of survival in the city. There was no communications left to organize and command formations with, so MG Dean figured the only way to command and control what he had left was at the front lines and he decided to kill a few North Koreans while he was at it as well.

Ultimately in Taejon the biggest problem ended up not being the T-34s but the amounts of North Korean infantry infiltrating into the city dressed in the white clothes of South Korean civilians. This caused confusion and hesitation for many US soldiers who were hesitant to fire against them.

Remember these soldiers just three weeks prior were lounging around doing occupation duty in post-World War II Japan and now not even a month later they are in the fight of their lives against a ruthless enemy with more men, weapons, and armor who are more than willing to dress like civilians in order to gain a tactical advantage. This willingness to dress like civilians would lead to later controversies as the US was blamed for killing civilians; claims that still resonate to this day from some elements in South Korean society.

Despite all the difficulties General Dean and his men faced, they were able to delay the North Koreans in Taejon from July 17th all the way to July 20th before MG Dean made the decision that he and his remaining men evacuate the city. That day elements from the recently arrived 1st Cavalry Division had arrived on the outskirts of Taejon to help evacuate the 24ID soldiers left in Taejon.  The 24ID had paid in blood to give the 1CAV the time needed for them to deploy from Japan to Korea. The 1CAV was now about to begin paying their own dues in blood as well.

Overall, from the 7 hours Taskforce Smith first bought for the US in the first American battle in the Korean War, to the 3 days MG Dean and his men bought with their guerrilla campaign in Taejon; the destruction of the 24ID and the loss of thousands of American lives bought the US military a total of two precious weeks of time. The American leadership was literally trading lives for time and the 24ID prevented the clock from running out for both the Americans and the South Koreans they gave their lives for to defend.

With the 1CAV trying to evacuate the 24ID, MG Dean and his small team tried to reach them in one of the few Jeeps they have left, but under heavy North Korean fire his driver missed the turn that would have taken them to the outskirts of the city where the 1CAV was located. With North Korean fire increasing the Jeep could not turn around and MG Dean ordered the driver to just keep driving straight and that is what he did. Eventually the General Dean and his men reached the outskirts of the city and split up and hid in the hillsides. They hoped to escape and evade the North Koreans long enough to make it back to friendly lines. MG Dean evaded the North Koreans for 35 days before he was eventually captured. When he was discovered MG Dean attacked the North Korean soldiers hoping they would kill him. However, the North Koreans held him down and tied him up. They brought him back to the local police station where they discovered that this old, dirty, malnourished man was actually an American General.

The saddest part about General Dean’s capture was that his location wasn’t discovered by chance by the North Koreans, but he was rather in fact turned in by South Koreans. A little known fact about South Korea before the Korean War was the amount of communist sympathizers in the southern provinces of the country. The ROK government before, during, and even after the Korean War had to commit ROK Army units to quell multiple communist uprisings in the South Korean countryside. For multiple historical reasons, communism was an attractive ideology for many South Korean peasants. MG Dean was turned in to the North Korean authorities by one of these communist sympathizers in South Korea.

This betrayal of MG Dean would cause him to serve over three years in North Korean POW camps. MG Dean would not see freedom again until September of 1953. After his release from North Korea MG Dean said that he would not have awarded himself a wooden star for what he did, instead the President of the United States awarded him the Medal of Honor.

December 1953 Issue of TIME Magazine Featuring MG Dean

Prior Posting:  Kum River Defense

You can read more of the ROK Drop featured series Heroes of the Korean War at the below link:

Kum River Defense

After the withdrawal south of the Kum River and the destruction of the bridges across it, the US21st regiment now found itself with a total of only 325 men between the two battalions that composed the regiment to face the approximately 20,000 NKPA soldiers bearing down on them on the opposite bank of the river. MG Dean decided to move up the 19th Infantry regiment from Taejon and what was left of the 34th Regiment from their earlier fight in Choenan to reinforce the 21st. With the addition of the 19th and the 34th roughly 4,300 men were now in defensive positions south of the Kum River while the men of 21st took up a reserve positions behind the other two regiments, to face the two advancing North Korean divisions supported by 50 tanks. Total combat power of the division stood at 11,000 men and the US24th Division had already lost roughly 1,800 men and many more would be lost before this battle was over.

The US34th manned the left flank of the Kum River defense. It is important to keep in mind that the US34th’s combat power was greatly diminished after their defeat and withdrawal from both Pyeongtaek and Choenan. The regiment was short of personnel, weapons, and equipment. The equipment they were most short on was radios, which would ultimately play a key role in the failure of the Kum River defense. L company of the US34th was on the farthest left flank of the US defensive line. The company commander had no communications with anyone, which means he had no situational awareness of the overall battle plan. The North Koreans began shelling L company’s position and began their river crossing operation. Seeing the overwhelming North Korean unit approaching and not knowing where the other US units were the commander decided to withdraw his unit all the way back to the battalion headquarters. The commander was relieved on the spot by the battalion commander for leaving his position and allowing the North Koreans to cross the river. Keep in mind that this commander had been withdrawing since his unit first made contact with the North Koreans back in Pyeongtaek. Withdrawing had become a natural reaction to an overwhelming North Korean attack. Retreat had become contagious and L company wasn’t the only ones doing it. Ultimately the entire US34th regiment withdrew leaving the US19th to face the two North Korean divisions by themselves.

Before the North Koreans began any operations on the US19th regiment, their scouts had located the positions of the US field artillery positions located to the rear of the US19th. The North Korean infantry simply crossed the river where the US34th had withdrawn and walked around and to the rear of the US19th to destroy the field artillery locations. The US field artillery were really the only guns capable of stopping the North Korean armor. In one quick attack the North Koreans were able to destroy a battalion of US field artillery and further limit their already desperate ability to destroy NKPA armor.

However, the US19th continued a rugged defense against the NKPA infantry which had crossed the Kum and was eventually able to repel them, while US air power was able to inflict heavy damage on enemy tanks trying to forge the Kum River. Amazingly the US regiment held off two North Korean divisions and even inflicted heavy casualties on them while doing so. For the entire day of July 15th things were actually looking up. However, it wouldn’t last, things would change quite drastically that night.

The North Koreans realized the amount of casaulties from US air strikes during the day made night operations an absolute must. In the early morning hours of July 16th at 0300, all hell broke loose on the Kum River. The North Koreans through everything they had at the US19th across the Kum River. Every element including the regimental command post found themselves under attack sustained enemy attack. Colonel Winstead the commander of the US19th organized a counterattack force of his unit’s clerks, supply personnel, cooks, and staff officers. The counterattack was actually successful at driving a large formation of North Korean infantry back across the river, but both the regiment’s key officers the adjuntant and operations officers were killed leading the counterattack force.

US Soldiers Battle the North Koreans Along the Kum River North of Taejon

The death of officers, particularly senior officers, in the early weeks of the Korean War was a reoccurring theme due to the lack of communications which caused senior officers to personally organize and lead attacks instead of giving commands over the radio to subordinates. This would phenomenom would have a cumulative effect, as unit’s lost their key leaders, discipline of the troops dropped, which contributed to the tendency to instantly retreat once confronted by the enemy. An old axiom says that leaders lead from the front; no where was that more true than the early weeks of the Korean War.

Even though the counterattack caused a large formation of the North Koreans to retreat, many others were able to infiltrate into the regiment’s rear areas and set up road blocks to prevent the resupply of the regiment. Many of the North Koreans setting up these road blocks had infiltrated dressed in the white clothes of South Korean refugees. Supply personnel located in these rear areas were not to keen about mounting any counterattack against the North Korean road blocks.

By late afternoon the regiment was given orders to withdraw, but the roadblocks prevented most of the US units from withdrawing with their vehicles. With many of the regiment’s officers dead, a majority of the US soldiers simply decided to retreat cross country and left all their vehicles where they were at instead of fighting their way through the road blocks. Some made out of the Kum River defense and others didn’t. In fact retreating soldiers straggled into Taejon all that night and the next morning including COL Winstead who was severely wounded and exhausted from the sustained fighting of the Kum River defense. On the morning of July 17th less than half of the US19th regiment had made it back to Taejon. The rest were either dead, captured, or missing.

MG Dean now had three regiments that were actually only regiments in name only. The US21st regiment was depleted from the Taskforce Smith battle at Osan and the hill defense north of the Kum River, while the US34th regiment was smashed at Pyeongtaek and Choenan, and the US19th regiment was now less than half strength from trying to hold the Kum River. MG Dean wanted to withdraw the 24th Division from Taejon, but LTG Walker flew up to Taejon and in a face to face meeting told MG Dean the 24ID had to keep delaying the North Korean advance at Taejon because the follow on US forces had not arrived in theatre yet to defend the Naktong River line. The US forces were literally looking at being pushed into the sea if the 24ID didn’t hold on.

MG Dean understood what LTG Walker ordered was essentially suicide for him and his men, but he obeyed the order and what was left of the 24ID prepared to try and hold Taejon. The fate of the entire Korean War would fall on the shoulders of these few determined men.

Next Posting: The Fall of Taejon

Prior Posting: General William Dean – Part 1

Then:

Kyongbukgung Pavilion in Seoul, 1971

Now:

Kyongbukgung Pavilion in Seoul Today

One of the first real heroes of the Korean War was without a doubt Major General William Dean. MG Dean was the commanding general of the 24th Infantry Division. The 24th Infantry Division was stationed in Japan conducting occupation duties prior to the start of the Korean War. With the outbreak of the Korean War the division was picked to deploy from Japan to Korea to stop the North Korean advance. The most famous unit from this division would go down in history known as Taskforce Smith.

Normally a general would want his division to deploy as a single unit and fight as a single formation, however due to the speed of the North Korean assault the 24ID had to deploy piece meal in order to delay the North Korean advance to the southern port city of Pusan. Taskforce Smith was just the first of all the 24ID’s battalions to be deployed to Korea in this piece meal manner.

Starting with Taskforce Smith, which first engaged the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) on July 5th, 1950 just North of Osan, every battalion of the 24ID would eventually be defeated and over run by the numerically and militarily superior NKPA forces. 24ID units were defeated in Pyeongtaek and Choenan as well. What was left of the 24ID fell back to the division headquarters in Taejon commanded by MG Dean.

MG Dean knew immediately the strategic importance of Taejon. The Kum River ran to the north of the city and provided the only natural defensive line for the US forces to take advantage of before falling back to the last and final natural defensive line the Naktong River near Pusan. Additionally the additional units from the US mainland and Japan had not arrived in theatre yet to relieve the 24ID much less set up an defensive line along the Naktong River. The bottom line was that if Taejon fell quickly the war was lost because the North Koreans could quickly advance to Pusan and end the war before US reinforcements arrived on the peninsula. MG Dean knew his division had to fight to the end in order to buy time for the US forces. It was a job no general would want but Dean executed it without complaint.

US 8th Army Commander Lieutenant General Walker and Major General Dean Confer before the Battle of Taejon

MG Dean utilized what was left of his 24ID’s, 21st Infantry Regiment (Taskforce Smith was part of), 19th Infantry Regiment, and the almost combat ineffective 34th Infantry Regiment which had it’s commanding officer killed in action and the entire regiment almost destroyed before retreating from Choenan. Dean assigned the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Infantry the sister battalion of Taskforce Smith, to man the hill tops north of the Kum River. The Taskforce Smith remnants would remain in reserve. The regiment was commanded by COL Stephens who was given orders on July, 10th 1950 by MG Dean to hold the positions for 4 days.

The next day the regiment found themselves in a life and death battle with first the North Korean 3rd Division which days earlier the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, had designated the “Seoul” Division for “liberating” Seoul. The NK 3rd Division’s morale was high and headed straight for the US3-21 battalion. The NK 3rd Division used their tried and true tactics of massing fire on the Americans while tanks and infantry flanked around them and set up road blocks denying the Americans their natural avenues of retreat. These road blocks caused units to disentegrate as soldiers ran wildly to escape the North Koreans instead of conducting an orderly withdrawal. Often the soldiers when they did retreat would just drop their rifles and helmets due to their weight and run as fast as possible once their unit was over run by the NKPA. By mid-day on July 11th the lead 21IN battalion was overrun and their battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Jensen killed along with most of his staff.

COL Stephens from his command post in the rear began to round up the straglers retreating from the front. COL Stephens quickly reorganized the soldiers and then committed the 1-21 battalion (Taskforce Smith) into action once again. By this time the battalion plus worth of soldiers was now facing two complete North Korean Divisions, both the NK4th and NK3rd Divisions. Ironically enough the Taskforce Smith soldiers had retreated once from the NK4th and now found themselves going into battle once again against them.

On a side note, some may remember both of these North Korean divisions as well from an earlier posting I did on The Battle of Uijongbu.

Russian Made T-34 Tank that Devastated Both ROK and US Militaries During the Early Years of the Korean War

Much like the original Taskforce Smith battle against the NK4th north of Osan, the unit aquitted themselves quite well, but just didn’t have the man power and equipment to handle the North Korean tanks and their superior numbers. In fact it is amazing the 21st Infantry held out until July 12th before requesting withdrawal south of the Kum River from MG Dean. MG Dean agreed and the 21st moved south of the Kum River by 1600 on the 12th. MG Dean had ordered the 21st to hold their positions for 4 days, it was quite amazing I think that they even lasted the three days they did against the two North Korean divisions.

If anything this fight so far had demonstrated that the NKPA divisions were not the unstoppable force at the beginning of the war as is widely believed. The NK4th could have been forced to retreat by the ROK7th Division during the Battle of Uijongbu if the ROK2nd Division hadn’t withdrew during the battle allowing their rear to be exposed by the NK3rd. Earlier the during the battle in Pocheon further up the highway 43 corridor north of Seoul the ROK2nd actually forced the NK3rd into retreat before the ROK2nd was forced to retreat to Uijongbu where they did ultimately collapse. With a shortage of men and no anti-armor weapons the ROK military actually aquitted themselves quite well considering the circumstances and now the Americans with the same limitations in fire power and men had also proven that this was not an invincible enemy when confronted by determined men.

Though history has judged Taskforce Smith harshly, the reality is that the soldiers of not only Taskforce Smith, but also the entire US21st Infantry Regiment fought bravely and should be remembered for the determined defense they put up against tremendous odds early on in the Korean War. As courageously as they fought, more fighting for the US21st and the rest of the 24ID was to come.

Next Posting: The Kum River Defense

Richardson from the The Korea Liberator has a good article posted over at the Asia Times, titled South Korea Must Choose Sides.  He is right about that, but I don’t see South Korea doing it any time soon as long President Roh is in power.

For those who thought that the change in the Marine Corps drinking age from 21 to 20 for Marines stationed on Okinawa would be a prelude to change for soldiers stationed in Korea as well, will be sadly disappointed:

U.S. Forces Korea officials said Thursday that the drinking age for its personnel is 21 ¿ and it¿s going to stay that way.

¿USFK is not considering a revision of the current policy,¿ spokesman Dave Oten replied via e-mail when asked whether the command planned to mirror a new U.S. Marine Corps policy announced Thursday for Okinawa and Japan.

Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Weber, commander of Marine Corps Bases Japan, lowered the drinking age for his troops from 21 to 20 effective this coming Monday. Marine officials said the change ensures the Corps¿ policy is consistent with Japanese law and that the Marines will be treated like other U.S. servicemembers and the Japanese public.

Here is the common complaint from US soldiers about the drinking age policy:

Pfc. Cristin Baughman, 21, was 19 when she first arrived in South Korea.

¿It¿s all about personal responsibility,¿ said Baughman, of Area I headquarters company. ¿There are plenty of people over 21 who can¿t handle their alcohol, just like people under 21 ¿ is a year really going to make that much of a difference?¿

Yes, it does make a difference.  Despite all the hoopla over taxi cab related incidents, USFK servicemembers statistically have been much better behaved overall since the drinking policy was raised to 21 years of age.  It is the same reason why E6’s and below will not be given back their driving privileges as well, because by percentage DUI’s dropped dramatically in USFK.  It is a fact of life that certain demographics cause more incidents than others.  This is not your daddy’s 1980 Korea anymore; today in Korea these incidents have strategic consequences for the alliance overall due to the increased media attention and public demagoging of these incidents by opportunistic South Korean NGO’s and politicians.

So to answer the young soldier’s question, yes that one year does matter.

This is actually a good precedent, which more US allies should take advantage of:

For the first time, an entire South Korean military unit is being sent to the United States for a training exercise, Ministry of National Defense officials confirmed Thursday.

South Korea’s 24th Forces Chemical Battalion is headed to Maryland to train with the U.S. Army on eliminating weapons of mass destruction, MND spokesman Maj. Joo Myoung-soo confirmed Thursday.

Joo discounted local media reports claiming the training was connected to heightened tensions with North Korea following recent missile tests.

He said this type of training has been conducted several times, though it¿s the first time an entire unit is headed to the States. The goal is to exchange education and training programs between the allies, he said.

The US has great training facilities and US allies should take advantage of every opportunity to train with US forces that they can get.  Imagine going to the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, CA for example and your unit having to do link up and integration with a US allied military into your units war plan.  That is great training in itself much less the world class tactical training that training centers like the NTC specialize in.