Here is an interesting Op-Ed in the Korea Times from a retired ROK Army general on what South Korea should learn from the Iran War:
(……..) There are clear parallels between Iran and North Korea. Both rely on missiles, coercive rhetoric and calibrated escalation to compensate for economic and conventional weakness. Both view nuclear capability as regime insurance. Both assume that external actors will ultimately avoid confrontation due to escalation risks.
The difference is that North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons. That reality does not guarantee safety. It merely raises the stakes.
The true stabilizing factor on the Korean Peninsula is not North Korea’s arsenal. It is the alliance structure anchored by South Korea, Japan and the United States. That structure imposes strategic restraint on all sides because any conflict would be immediate, catastrophic and alliance-driven.
But restraint depends on credibility.
Here is the uncomfortable point the Korean public must confront: the U.S.-ROK alliance is not indestructible. It is sustained by political will on both sides. If South Korea signals that the alliance is conditional, negotiable or politically expendable, Washington will not ignore that signal.
Great powers adjust. They always do.
Some in South Korea believe the alliance can be strategically “tested” — that Seoul can publicly distance itself from Washington, question joint exercises, dilute trilateral cooperation with Japan and still assume the American security guarantee remains unchanged. That is a dangerous illusion. (………)
If Washington perceives hesitation in Seoul, it will hedge. Hedging does not require abandonment. It requires adjustment — force posture changes, prioritization shifts, conditional commitments. And once strategic recalibration begins, it is rarely reversed quickly.
The first costs of miscalculation will not fall on Washington. They will fall on Seoul.
Progressives who advocate engagement with North Korea are not wrong to seek reduced tension. Dialogue is necessary. But dialogue that undermines deterrence credibility invites coercion. There is no historical example in which weakening alliance solidarity strengthened negotiating leverage with a nuclear-armed adversary.
Strategic autonomy is often invoked as justification for recalibrating ties with the United States. But autonomy without substitute capability is exposure. China will not defend South Korea against Northern aggression. Japan cannot replace American extended deterrence. An independent nuclear option would impose severe economic and diplomatic penalties on South Korea. (………)
Testing the alliance for domestic political leverage is not strategic sophistication. It is strategic gambling in an increasingly unforgiving environment.
Korea Times
You can read the whole thing at the link.