The Lessons Learned from Task Force Smith
Task Force Smith though poorly trained and ill equipped was still able to put up an effective defense for a limited amount of time. If they had land mines, air support, and more ammunition they probably could of sustained their defense longer and inflicted more casualties. However, with two approaching North Korean divisions they were sure to be over run at some point and the Army commanders in Tokyo knew this. So to blame the defeat of Task Force Smith solely on the unit and LTC Smith, like some people like to believe, for allowing his unit to become so poorly trained and outfitted during peace time, I find to be misguided.
The Army commanders in Tokyo are the ones that allowed the soldiers of 1-21 Infantry and the rest of the occupation forces in Japan to become so poorly trained and ill equipped in the first place, but it really isn’t their fault either. As is so often the case the blame really lies with the politicians.
The US Congress at the time set the Army’s strength at 10 combat Divisions, but they did not provide enough money to sustain these 10 Divisions. At best there was enough money to fund only 6 Divisions. The politicians however are always eager to not be seen as “soft on defense” and mandated that 10 Divisions had to be kept knowing full well they would not be properly funded. After all the US had the atomic bomb, who needs ground forces when you have nukes, right? At least that is what Congress thought.
The Army short on money chose to use their scarce resources to ensure that the front line Divisions in Germany were fully manned and trained due to the increasing Soviet threat than to allocate resources to an occupation force in Japan. Thus the four Army Divisions in Japan received little money for equipment and training and many units were only filled with 50% of their required personnel.
Combine this with the John Wayne attitude of the military’s youth at the time and this is how you end up with a Task Force Smith. It is important to understand that Task Force Smith was not unique. It was just microcosm of the military in the Pacific that was allowed to weaken by the US government due to budgetary reasons that forces the military to focus its scant resources to defend Europe then to train an occupation army.
The politicians apparently thought just like the young soldiers, that enough John Wayne movies and patriotism can make up for rigorous training and good equipment. Past greatness doesn’t sustain the readiness of an Army. If this was the case the French and Italians would still be military powers today. Training and the best equipment are what makes a military strong.
However, as often is the case, the politicians don’t pay for their bone headed errors, the soldiers do and Task Force Smith payed for these mistakes in blood.
Today a memorial to the soldiers of Task Force Smith can be found just off of Highway 1 between Osan and Suwon. It is a fitting memorial with sculptures depicting American soldiers facing off in every direction just like they were that rainy day on July 5, 1950.
Check out these references for more information about Task Force Smith:
This Kind of War by T.R. Fehrenbach
North to the Yalu, South to the Naktong by Roy Edgar Appleman
I'm busy with the London bombings right now, but I'll try to find the link —-
but I'm positive the Appleman book is available online off a US Army site. If I remember correctly, I found it off a website from the department of the Army that handles the official histories, of which the Appleman book is one. The other books on the Korean War are there as well.
It is all loaded on the site and/or downloadable. I can't remember if the photos from the book are as well. I think so. I think I remember it doesn't have them embedded in the page, but it has a link if you want to see the image, it will load for you.
Anway, seeing that you had linked to amazon.com, I thought I'd point out to you and others that you can get it for free on the net.
Since I started following some of these Korea blogs I've kept the links bookmarked as references. No substitute for having the actual volumes IMO as it's just too hard to read a book online; but, it makes for easy referral.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR:
SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU
(June-November 1950)
by Roy E. Appleman
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1992 (first printed 1961)
http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/korea/20-2-1/toc.ht…
3 other volumes of this series are available online:
Ebb and Flow (Nov 1950-Jul 1951),
Policy & Direction: The First Year, and
Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Jul 51-Jul 53).
(Listed in chronogical sequence of actual events, however I don't think the books were published in this order nor are they numbered as Volumes I, II, III, etc.)
A fifth volume (The Medics War) seems to be unavailable online.
I didn't see any photos incorporated in the online text, not sure if you can see them elsewhere on the CMH site.
(Welcome to CMH Online!, at http://www.army.mil/cmh/)
I used to think the same things about reading on the computer, and I still prefer to have it in print — I can't read the computer in a hot bath, but if I had a good sized palm pilot?
Anyway, recently, I've downloaded a lot of the old Rex Stout Nero Wolfe mystery novels because I couldn't get them around here and don't want to spend the money on amazon.com, and I'm starting to get used to reading ebooks. These Stout novels are for the Microsoft Reader which also reads the books in that awkward computer voice, but vastly better than when I first started playing around with computer speech on the old commadore 64.
5 years from now, you won't need books on tape/cd. The computer will be able to read it for you in dramatic fashion…
I did a staff ride at the site of Task Force Smith about six years ago, and found it very enlightening. I had read Fehrenbach's book years prior, and was under the impression ahead of time that Task Force Smith was a group of under trained, under-equipped sacrificial lambs. That wasn't exactly accurate.
It turns out that Smith was an extraordinary commander who had spent many months in Japan training up his poorly trained men into a well disciplined and highly effective combat unit. They were however, poorly equipped, under-manned, and making due with what they had on hand.
When they were thrown into the fight, Smith received very vague orders and little guidance. His instructions were to basically push north until they made contact with the enemy, and fight them as best as they could until reinforcements could arrive.
What happened next was a text-book Ft Benning style defense. Smith did something, upon investigation, turned out to be a brilliant analysis and establishment of a battalion defense, with good use of direct and indirect fires. The man did everything right–despite his lack of intelligence of enemy forces.
The downfall of Task Force Smith came not due to ill-trained troops, but to overwhelming North Korean combat power. Their T-34 tanks and thousands of ground troops were like a tidal wave as they assaulted Smith's battalion.
Smith's men fought valiantly and inflicted murderous casualties on the enemy, until North Korean infantry were literally jumping into American foxholes with bayonets afixed.
This is when Smith gave the order to withdraw. He ordered that the companies withdraw one at a time, while the others provided supporting suppressive fires on the enemy. Leapfrogging to the rear if you will. Unfortunately, panic set in, and an orderly withdrawal turned into a rout.
Anyway, I'll have to get some links and post them here when I get the chance. Task Force was a pretty interesting chapter in the history of the Korean War.
As I did a more in depth study of Task Force Smith I also found them to be a better unit than what they are commonly portrayed to have been. They remarkably well considering all the disadvantages they were faced with. A lot of it was because of the leadership of LTC Smith who is often unfairly portrayed as a leader who let his men become untrained in post-war Japan when in reality he kept his unit highly trained considering the circumstances. You have to figure he must of had one of the best trained units in Japan to have the 24th ID commander select him to go first to Korea to fight the North Koreans. MG Dean wouldn't have just asked anyone to do this mission. He would of selected the best.